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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
ISSUE I 
Did the trial court err in ruling as a matter of law that 
Mr. Reynolds had no right to enjoin his wife from aborting their 
unborn child? 
ISSUE II 
Should the trial court have balanced the rights and 
interests of Mr. and Mrs. Reynolds and determined whether Mr. 
Reynolds1 right to procreate and associate with his child 
should, under the circumstances, prevail over Mrs. Reynolds1 
right to an abortion? 
ISSUE III 
Did the trial court err in holding that this controversy 
involves "state action", and therefore was controlled by Planned 
Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1975)? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
=ats=ss===ssBs=&B==s=saB=SBsassss=s=:===s==s==E====s=s=ss 
Nature of the Case 
This case stems from a divorce court dispute over the 
disposition of the parties1 unborn child. Only the abortion 
related issues are involved in this appeal. 
Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Reynolds filed for divorce March 22, 1988 and was 
awarded a Temporary Restraining Order, which was served upon 
Irs . Key h o l d s
 r p t ' ,T"»nl l r g h e r t e m p o r a r i l y from . a b o r t i n g t h e i r 
inborn c h i l d . 
Af'ff! h e a r i n g t h e m a t t e r ( w i t h o u t h i k i n g e v i d e n c e ) on 
l a r c h 30,- iLJliHl( i IK.1 (• i il i n i r• • -*• M! in «fi,ifif .1 P r e l i m i n a r y 
Lii. m n c f ion r*nd l i f t e d t h e Temporary R e s t r a i n i n g U U 
iriLerloL'iJL'ji y a p p e j I "• • 4'«»"»"« I H u p C o u r t , which a j . , e a l WB? 
J I smissed when Mis , r. vnold-> lm<l Ir. 1 nl il i n I ' t - « 
s e r v n H "Mill i hp R e s t r a i n i n g Order from t h i s C o u r t . 
""I"! i i M i / h o i a b l c ; U d v i i l .'• 'in' mil ihi'ii cer t i f ied th is issue 
f o r a p p e a x and also bifurcated the case. 
111« snn.s i t i on -at Tr i a I Court 
No trial was had i m nidi M-I , i i m il if in 
ilk i ii ik* • I i n war; .ircompli shnd based solely upon affidavits jmi 
proffers. The judyj i >J I < i<" M I I i ill MI nil law th-nt Mr, Reynolds 
as n father had I M i njtii h, present: a case as » .1 wii , >i ^ . t*e 
shou id b» i u jo i 1"" I 1 1 "i hnrt i ng 1 li*-» 1 » ch i Id • 
Summary al llelevaul Uriels 
The parties wpre married for less than two years r an! it 
the time ol: CUIIM -n •' >in 1 1 irtio;" defendant was pregnai ' 
•vith their second ':h i Id. which hhc W I S I K J I . tl». . '" ' J 
J" 1 i " undisputed that plaintiff was the natuial father 
:'.• u nbor n ch 1 I d, . 111 -1 I J - it pof .< " \ tpea 1 plaintiff 
^ d e s the pregnancy was nearing flu- tjuil 1 11»• r 1 1 J 
trimester. id " ^ip-Mion nas been made m a t d<:?fendant 
in anything but good health, cimJ rio claim m-i-. b«j n iii.nii 1 hat 
order. R. 122-124. The Honorable Judge Garff, the first 
available judge, signed the temporary order at about 12:55 p.m. 
The order was served on the clinic about 1:25 p.m. and defendant 
herself was not served until later that evening. According to 
the clinic, the abortion had been performed about 1:00. This 
Court denied the petition for interlocutory appeal the next day. 
R. 126-127. 
The trial court certified the abortion issue for 
immediate appeal and bifurcated the Case on May 20, 1988. R. 
139-141. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Fathers have fundamental liberty rights and interests in 
their own children, which is of approximately equal value with 
mothers' right to abortion. No controlling jurisdiction has 
decided this issue. Due process rights may be accorded to a 
father only by allowing a full hearing to weigh the respective 
rights and interest of the parents. 
This appeal is not barred by mootness since it is a 
controversy which is likely to repeat itself/ yet evades review. 
No state action is involved, so the Roe v. Wade decisions 
do not apply. 
xi. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Danforth does not preclude a court from balancing a father1s 
rights in an unborn child with the mother's right to an abortion. 
This is a case of first impression in Utah. However, 
the mother has consistently but incorrectly argued that the 
father's claim is entirely overcome by the Supreme Court's 
decision in Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforthf 428 U.S. 
52 (1975) . An overbroad reading of that case is the root of the 
lower court's error. Danforth held that a "State may not 
constitutionally require the consent of the spousef as is 
specified under [the Missouri statute examined], as a condition 
for abortion during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy.11 Id. at 69. 
But the Missouri statute troubling the Court purported to create 
rights much different from those asserted by the father here. 
In Danforth the legislature had given one spouse an 
absolute vetof for any or no reasonf to the absolute exclusion 
of the other. A husband (who might not even be the father, Id. 
at 69) had the unilateral power to forbid that an abortion be 
performed on his wifef and his mandate could not be controverted 
or reviewed by any higher authority. Id. at 71. While the 
father here seeks a case by case balancing of rights and 
interests, Missouri had done its own arbitrary balancing, 
striking the balance permanently and absolutely in favor of the 
father. The Court struck down a per se rulef not a balancing 
test. 
Since the mother here seeks an unbridled right to decide 
whether the fetus is born or terminated, without regard for the 
father, the Court could find her position to be more repugnant to 
the spirit of Danforth than the individualized balancing the 
father proposes. 
The trial court mistakenly read Danforth to have already 
accomplished the balancing of rights and interests the father 
sought. It is an understandable error, sincef out of context, we 
find the following quote Judge Young read at the hearing: 
Inasmuch as it is the woman who physically bears 
the child and who is the more directly and 
immediately affected by the pregnancyf as between 
the two, the balance weighs in her favor. 
Id. at 71. 
The Supreme Courtf however, was weighing the effect of 
leaving the statutory per se absolute veto intact against the 
effect of striking it down and allowing the woman a choice. As 
between these absolutes, the Court preferred the right of the 
mother. 
The Court carefully illustrated that it was not 
considering the constitutionality of a more tailored approach 
allowing for a case by case balance. Referring to the spousal 
consent provision it struck down, the Court wrote: 
This section does much more than insure that the 
husband participate in the decision whether his 
wife should have an abortion. The State, instead, 
has determined that the husband's interest in 
continuing the pregnancy of his wife always 
outweighs any interest on her part in terminating 
it irrespective of the condition of their marriage. 
The State, accordingly, has granted him the right 
to prevent unilaterally, and for whatever reason, 
the effectuation of his wife's and her physician's 
decision to terminate her pregnancy. This state 
determination . . . has interposed an absolute 
obstacle to a woman's decision that Roe held to be 
constitutionally protected from such interference. 
Id. at 70-71 [emphasis supplied]. 
In the wake of Danforth, the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals was careful to limit its ruling to the facts when faced 
with a similarly broad Kentucky statute. Wolfe v. Schroering, 
541 F.2d 523 (1978). After striking down the absolute veto with 
which the legislature had endowed the husband, the court vowed it 
would refrain from deciding whether a more narrowly drafted 
statute would pass constitutional muster. 541 F.2d at 526. 
Danforth and its progeny, despite claims to the 
contrary, do not really deal with the rights of men as fathers. 
They merely consider the rights of husbands. Thus, the statute 
Danforth struck down was overbroad. Not only did it give a veto 
power rather than an interest or voice for balancing, the power 
was given to husbands, not just fathers. The fathers issue 
remains to be decided by any court of controlling jurisdiction 
over this case. 
II. Fathers have constitutional rights to their children. 
Along with society, in the twentieth century courts 
recognized that fathers have not only duties, but also important 
constitutional rights in their children. Failure to give 
appropriate weight to a father's interests is a violation of 
these rights. 
The United States Supreme Court's decisions on point 
follow two important lines of cases: those supporting the right 
- 3 -
to procreate and those limiting the termination of parental 
rights. "Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very 
existence and survival of the race." Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 
U.S. 535 (1942). The Court has repeatedly emphasized that 
[w]ithout doubt [the liberty guaranteed under the fourteenth 
amendment] denotes the right of the individual to . . . establish 
a home and bring up children. . . ." Meyer v. Nebraskaf 262 U.S. 
390, 399 (1923) . 
A. Fathers have a right to procreate. 
"Procreation" means "the entire process of bringing a 
new individual into the world." Dorland's Illustrated Medical 
Dictionary (24th ed. 1965) . Similarly, the recent case of In re 
Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988), stated, "Itlhe right to 
procreate very simply is the right to have natural children. . . 
It is no more than that." Id. at 1253. 
Obviously, the right to procreate—to have a natural 
child—extends to both parents. But a mother's procreation right 
is logically distinguishable from the limited right granted by 
Roe v. Wade to destroy the creation. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
Because the mother also has the right to procreate, the father 
may not force her to have an abortion. Harris v. State, 356 
So.2d 623 (Ala. 1978) . And despite his desire and offer to pay 
for an abortion, he may not escape his paternal duties when the 
mother refuses to abort. Id. at 624. 
Similarly, the father claims no right to force a woman 
to become a mother against her wishes in order to satisfy his 
- 4 -
desire to be a father. He has no right to force a woman to have 
intercourse with him, and in this case he did not. When the 
action began, the parties were already mother and father of an 
unborn child. The action was precipitated by the mother's desire 
to change father's status from father to manf extinguishing the 
father's constitutional rightsf by terminating the child. 
B. Fathers have rights to raise and enjoy their 
offspring. 
Separate and in addition to the right to father, is the 
right to be a father. Natural parents have constitutional rights 
to raise, associate with, and enjoy their children that a state 
cannot sever absent clear and convincing evidence of parental 
unfitness. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). In short, 
these family rights are "fundamental". Santosky held that a 
"preponderance of the evidence" standard of proof for termination 
of parental rights failed to sufficiently recognize "the 
fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, 
custody, and management of their child." 455 U.S. at 753. Only 
"clear and convincing evidence" that parental rights are not in 
the best interest of the child can overcome such fundamental 
rights. In re Brand, 479 So.2d 66 (Ala.Civ.App. 1985). 
Santosky observed that [elven when blood relationships 
are strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing the 
irretrievable destruction of their family life." 455 U.S. at 
753. 
In 1972 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), 
recognized paternal rights of illegitimate fathers. The decision 
was such a break with past civil and common lawr one writer 
accused the Court of "having just discovered that dads are 
people, too." Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy, Mich. L. 
Rev. 81:463, 499. It appears some sectors of society wish to 
keep that discovery a secret. Stanley summed up the rights of 
fathers as follows: 
The private interest here, that of a man in the 
children he has sired and raised, undeniably 
warrants deference and, absent a powerful 
countervailing interest, protection. It is plain 
that the interest of a parent in the companionship, 
care, custody, and management of his or her 
children 'comes to this Court with a momentum for 
respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties 
which derive merely from shifting economic 
arrangements.' 
405 U.S. at 651. 
The Stanley Court did not stop there, but went on to 
observe: 
The Court has frequently emphasized the importance 
of the family. The rights to conceive and to raise 
one's children have been deemed 'essential,1 Meyer 
v. Nebraska, 'basic civil rights of man,' Skinner 
v. Oklahoma, and [rlights far more precious . . . 
than property rights,' May v. Anderson. 'It is 
cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture 
of the child reside first in the parents . . . . 
The integrity of the family unit has found 
protection in the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and the Ninth Amendment. 
[405 U.S. at 651, Citations Omitted]. 
Santosky confirms that the father's fundamental rights 
to care, custody and management of his child originate in the 
liberty clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 455 U.S. at 745. So 
the foundation of the father's rights as father is the same one 
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on which Roe v. Wade found a right of privacy protecting 
abortion. 410 U.S. 153. A father's right in his child has been 
declared "cognizable and substantial" under the United States 
Constitution. Quillon v. Walcottf 434 U.S. 246, 248 (1978). 
Obviously such rights may not be enjoyed in an aborted 
child. His fundamental rights may only be fully exercised if he 
is able to protect the child until live birth. In fact one of 
the basic interests of the father is that of providing "loving 
protection" for the child. Rivera v. Minnichf 107 S.Ct. 3001, 
3004 (1987) . Hence the father here sought to have his rights 
balanced against those granted to the mother by the same Court. 
C. Utah carefully protects parental rights. 
From the first compilation of statutes after statehood, 
Utah has given the father and mother substantial rights in their 
children. See R.S.Utah 1898 § 4. Those rights have been 
consistently protected since. Utah's Constitution declares, 
"Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to 
the security of individual rights and the perpetuity of free 
government." Art. I § 27. Fundamental rights of parents cannot 
be stressed too often or guarded too closely. 
Utah's legislature has provided that any physician 
performing an abortion shall first follow various procedures. § 
76-7-301 et seq. , UCA 1953. One is that he must "Hotify, if 
possible, • . . the husband of the woman, if she is married." § 
76-7-304, UCA 1953 (emphasis supplied). For what possible 
purpose did the legislature require notification of the husband, 
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unless it is so he may take a role in the decision, resorting to 
the courts if necessary, as the father did here. 
Spousal notification statutes have been upheld. Doe v. 
Deschamps, 461 F.Supp. 682 (Mont. 1976); Scheinberg v. Smith, 659 
F.2d 476 (1981) . 
Like the Fourteenth Amendment, Utah's Constitution 
provides, "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law." Art. I § 7. 
The words "life, liberty and property" are taken in 
their broadest sense as indicative of the three great 
subdivisions of all civil rights. McGrew v. Industrial Comm., 96 
0. 203, 85 P.2d 608. "Property" embraces all valuable interests 
a person may possess outside of himself, that is to say, outside 
of his life and liberty. It is not confined to mere tangible 
property, but to every species of vested right. Id. It must 
include, then, the rights to procreate, rear and enjoy children. 
As indicated above, the interest vests upon actual conception of 
an individual. 
This provision has been used to protect the rights of 
Utah parents, and should protect the father here, independent of 
his federal protections. In 1980 the legislature passed the 
Children's Rights Act, ch. 40, 1980 Utah Laws 288, amending § 
78-3a-48(l), UCA 1953. The requirement in the former statute 
that the court find a parent "unfit or incompetent by reason of 
conduct or condition seriously detrimental to the child" was 
removed, and replaced with a provision permitting involuntary 
termination upon a finding that such termination will be in "the 
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child's best interest." That change was struck down as violative 
of Art, 1 § 7. In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1374 (Utah 1982). 
J.P. observed that until that amendment Utah's statutory 
and common law have invariably upheld the rights of natural 
parents except in "extreme circumstances." 648 P.2d at 1366. 
The Code, for example, allows adoption without consent of natural 
parents only if the parent "has been judicially deprived of the 
custody of the child on account of cruelty, neglect, or 
desertion," or has abandoned the child. §§ 78-30-4, 78-30-5, UCA 
1953. See also current § 78-3a-48, UCA 1953. 
On the other hand the state has an independent interest 
in the welfare of its children. State in re Jennings, 20 Utah 2d 
50, 52, 432 P.2d 879, 880 (1967). But the "best interests" or 
"welfare" of the infant may only be considered after the parent's 
rights are terminated for unfitness, etc. In re J.P. , 648 P.2d 
1364, 1369 (Utah 1982) . 
By the 1980 enactment, Justice Oaks observed the 
legislature had failed to give appropriate weight to the right of 
a fit, competent parent to a parent-child relationship. 648 P.2d 
at 1368. Rearing children is, after all, a "fundamental right." 
In re Castillo, 632 P.2d 855, 856 (Utah 1981); State in re Walter 
B^, 577 P.2d 119, 124 (Utah 1978)(plurality opinion). Castillo 
declared that "the ideals of individual liberty which protect the 
sanctity of one's home and family" are "essential in a free 
society. . . ." 632 P.2d at 856. 
Under both the Federal (Ammendement. IX) and State (Art. 
I § 25 Constitutions, personal liberties are not limited to those 
grantedf but are a retention of rights in the people. See, In re 
J.P. , 648 P.2d 1373, 1369 (Utah 1982) , which went on to state: 
The rights inherent in family relationships— 
husband-wifer parent-child, and sibling—are the 
most obvious examples of rights retained by the 
people. They are "natural1 , 'intrinsic,' or 
'prior1 in the sense that our Constitutions 
presuppose them, as they presuppose the right to 
own and dispose of property. . . . Similarlyf the 
Court has characterized the right to procreate as 
among the 'basic civil rights of man.1 Skinner v. 
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 . . . . Blackstone 
deemed rthe most universal relation in nature . . 
. [to be] that between parent and child.' 1 W. 
Blackstonef Commentaries * 446. 
648 P.2d at 1364. Can it be doubted, then, that a father's 
rights are of at least as great import as the abortion rights of 
the mother? 
A parent's inherent authority and right to rear his own 
children are recognized as fundamental axioms of Anglo-American 
culture. To protect the individual in his "constitutionally 
guaranteed right to form and preserve the family is one of the 
basic principals for which organized government is established." 
In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1373 (Utah 1982). 
D. The father has shown a genuine interest. 
In affidavits filed with the lower court, the father has 
made clear that he not only wished that the child be allowed 
life. Rather, he offered to take and care for the child, meet 
all his or her needs and completely excuse the mother from her 
parental obligations. He acted quickly, near the end of the 
first trimester. Importantly, the father was married to the 
mother at all relevant times. "Parental rights are at their apex 
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for parents who are married.ff In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1374 
(Utah 1982) . 
In cases involving unwed fathers biology alone does not 
give rise to constitutional rights in one's children. The United 
States Supreme Court has stated in recent cases that illegitimate 
fathers have a protected relationship with their children only if 
they exercise their rights by assuming genuine responsibility for 
their children. See, Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); 
Quillon v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978). Although no such 
requirements are imposed upon natural fathers who are married to 
the mother, like the parties here, this father has gone to great 
lengths to protect his interests, but for naught. 
The right to procreate becomes particularized where, as 
here, conception results from an act of consensual intercourse. 
Once so particularized, that right continues through birth and 
beyond to the age of majority. The father's rights in the 
particular child conceived through the parties1 consensual, 
marital act are fundamental. They are equal in weight to those 
asserted by the mother, so a judicial balancing particularized to 
their circumstances is required. It is surely unconstitutional 
to disregard the rights of one parent and enforce fully the 
rights of the other. See, The Rights of the Father, Notre Dame 
Lawyer 50:483 (1975); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
If the father acts promptly, he must be afforded an immediate 
hearing to weigh the respective interests and burdens asserted by 
the father and mother. Id. 
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E. A balance may have tipped in favor of the father's 
right to save his child. 
Thus a right to privacy is relative, making a balancing 
approach most appropriate. The right of a man in his children 
"undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful 
countervailing interest, protection. In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 
1374 (Utah 1982), quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 
(1972); 92 S.Ct. at 1208, 1212; 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972). 
In the J.P. case Utah's Supreme Court has already 
undertaken to balance parental rights to their offspring, which 
precede the Constitution, against the newly created abortion 
right. 648 P.2d 1373-1375. The former, said Justice Oaks, are 
protected liberty rights under the due process clause of the 
United States Constitution. Id. at 1375. 
Unlike substantive due process cases like Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), which rely on a 'right 
of privacy' not mentioned in the Constitution to 
establish other rights unknown at common law, the 
parental liberty right at issue in this case is 
fundamental to the existence of the institution of 
the family, which is 'deeply rooted in this 
Nation's history and tradition', Moore v. City of 
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)(plurality 
opinion) , and in the 'history and culture of 
Western civilization." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 
U.S. 205, 232 (1972). . . . This rooting in 
history and the common law validates and limits 
the due process protection afforded parental 
rights, in contrast to substantive due process 
innovations undisciplined by any but abstract 
formulae. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 
U.S. at 503 n. 12. 
J.P., 648 P.2d at 1375. 
When the balancing is undertaken in a specific case, courts 
should be required to consider that parental rights cannot be 
denied absent a "clear and convincing evidence" standard to 
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overcome their rights. In re Castillo, 632 P.2d 855 (Utah 1981). 
Further, there are three interests, not two, to be considered. 
Utah has consistently emphasized it has an interest as parens 
patriae in children. See, J.P. , 648 P.2d at 1367. 
In a divorce case such as this one, the court is 
empowered to make such division of property and such child 
custody determinations as are just and reasonable. §§ 30-3-1 et. 
seq. The fetus must be either a child or a property right, and 
its status as between the parties may properly be determined. 
If a father disputes a decision to abort, this may 
remove the legal decision from the ill-defined area of right to 
privacy. Abortion: The Father's Rights, 42 U. Cin. L. Rev. 441, 
462 (1973). Since private rights meet private rights, both 
arising from similar sources and both fundamental, the woman's 
"right to privacy" as defined in extant abortion cases may not be 
relevant. The father's rights should be seen as about equal to 
those of the mother. Sherain, Beyond Roe and Doe: The Rights of 
the Father, 50 Notre Dame lawyer 483, 486 (1975). The father's 
interests and the state's could cumulate to override the mother's 
rights. Id. at 489. 
The balancing suggested by the father is necessary due 
to the wide variety of factual scenarios, interests and 
intentions which may exist. Hopefully society has progressed 
beyond using stilted, universally applied assumptions that one 
spouse always wins out; the sort of narrow-mindedness loathed by 
Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 478 U.S. 52 (1976). 
Fathers may assert that termination of the pregnancy 
could result in severe mental distress and possibly emotional 
illnessr since he also has a bond with the fetus. The father 
here commentedf "It feels like a part of me just got thrown 
away." Gurwell, Lawsuit May Have Ended With Abortion, USA Todayf 
Thurs. March 31, 1988 p. 3A. Fathers realize that while they may 
or may not have another fathering opportunity, the child aborted 
cannot be conceived again. Said another father who was unable to 
prevent his wife's abortion, "I was willing to take full 
responsibility and raise it and take care of it; there's nothing 
for me to do now but let the wounds heal." Brannigan, Suits 
Argue Fathers1 Rights in Abortion, Wall Street Journal, Tues., 
Aug. 23, 1988, p. 27. 
Mothers also stress, as have the courts, the trauma 
involved for a woman in the abortion decision and unwanted 
pregnancy. Id. 
Fathers may assert interests in procreation, health of 
their mate (including future fertility) and the health of their 
unborn child. 
A mother may be unable financially or emotionally to 
meet the needs of the child, as was alleged here. In such cases 
perhaps only a father willing to assume all emotional, physical, 
financial and other responsibilities (including prenatal care) 
would fair well in a balancing of rights and interests. Such a 
father is assuming grave physical, emotional and financial 
burdens likely to last at least eighteen years after birth. The 
mother would undergo nine months or more of emotional and 
physical difficulty. Can those months be said to always outweigh 
the eighteen years? 
While a mother with a special health problem would 
likely overcome most fathers' interests, if her reasons are 
personal preference and convenience they may not always prevail. 
III. A woman's right to abortion is not absolute. 
Clearly Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) held that 
the "right of privacy . . . founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's 
concept of personal liberty . . . is broad enough to encompass a 
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." The 
mother and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) asserted 
below an "absolute" constitutional right to abortion. Faced with 
similar claims in amicus briefs. Roe expressly held that "[t]he 
privacy right involved . . . cannot be said to be absolute. . . . 
[Tlhis right is not unqualified and must be considered against 
important state interests and regulation." 410 U.S. at 154. It 
further declared, "Neither in this opinion nor in Doe v. Bolton 
do we discuss the father's rights" if asserted against a 
woman's abortion choice. Id. at 165 n. 67 [citation omitted]. 
And as indicated above, Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. 
Danforth, the Court's only other case to mention fathers' 
abortion rights, is not determinative of this case. Like all 
cases, Danforth controls only cases factually "on all fours" with 
it, or nearly so. 
No case has precisely defined the right to privacy or 
its scope. It is a broad concept. The mother and ACLU have 
suggested it involves a bodily privacy. While it is true 
government intrusion into the body is disfavoredf the rights 
exercised here are privatef not governmental acts (as explained 
below). No case stands for the principle that bodily privacy 
somehow holds a preferred position in the area of privacy over 
associational privacies or is absolutely inviolable. States have 
thus been upheld in compelling vaccinations, Jacobson v. 
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) , participation in eugenics, 
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), involuntary blood testing, 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), and blood 
transfusion into a fetus over the religious objections of the 
mother, Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 
421, 201 A.2d 537, cert, denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964). 
IV. The mother's theory discriminates on account of gender. 
Even if Roe were read to suggest an initial presumption 
must be made in the woman's favor, it is not an irrebuttable 
presumption. The father also has interests and must have his 
chance to raise them. In fact, since the father's rights are 
also fundamental and arise from the same Fourteenth Amendment 
roots, the presumption would run both ways, and be offset. Such 
fundamental rights cannot be summarily and stereotypically 
disposed of by the state or court. The Supreme Court held that 
Illinois' presumption that illegitimate fathers are uncaring was 
an unconstitutional assumption. 
If the Constitution compels us to reject the legitimacy 
stereotype in that case, on what grounds can it be argued that it 
does not compel us to reject the sexual stereotype and require 
individual determinations in the father vs. mother abortion 
scenario? An irrebuttable presumption in favor of the 
illegitimate mother was struck down explicitly on the basis of 
Stanley. Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Services, 405 U.S. 1051 
(1972). In Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) the Court 
simply declared unconstitutional on sex discrimination grounds a 
New York law which allowed the mother, but not the unwed father, 
to veto the proposed adoption of her children. The state could 
not rely upon a statute favoring the mother "in all 
circumstances." Yet extending Danforth1s prohibition of an 
absolute one-parent veto to prevent consideration of the father's 
interests here is a strikingly similar and arbitrary 
discrimination. "The father then has the same rights, 
privileges, duties and powers as the mother. In the Interest of 
T.E.T., 603 S.W.2d 793, 796 (1980) (referring to adoption). 
The mother's desire to abort may be matched by an even 
stronger paternal desire for a child. Assumptions simply have no 
place here. Some fathers, like this one, so want their children 
that they are willing to take on all parental responsibilities. 
The Rights of the Father, Notre Dame Lawyer 50:483, 491-92 
(1975) . 
The proper goal must not be to give women a better 
status within the traditional stereotype, but to shatter the 
stereotype. Id. at 495. The "womens rights" cases were not 
merely victories for women, but for individuals whose rights 
should not be a function of sex. Fathers have too often been 
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victimized by sexism. Ironically it often comes from the 
women's movement. In this case, as Judge Young observed in 
chambers, the father's civil liberties are being overcome by the 
American Civil Liberties Union, and in similar cases "Planned 
Parenthood111 has rejected its namesake in favor of planned 
motherhood. 
In thousands of waysf in lawf in social mores, 
employment pattern, and psychological health, males 
are victims, along with womenr of a system that 
arbitrarily assigns roles on the basis of sex . . . 
[Mlany people now see the issue as one of a more 
reasonable and humane allocation of social roles 
without regard to sex rather than one as simply 
involving women's rights. 
Kanowitz, The Male Stake in Women's Liberationy Calif. W. L. Rev. 
424, 427 (1972) . 
It appears many assume that because the woman bears the 
child physically, her interests must always have the greater 
weight. The father is, therefor, automatically and categorically 
disadvantaged by natural evolution. The automatic assumption the 
woman has the stronger interest is a gender based distinction. 
Hafen, B. , The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and 
Sexual Privacy; Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 
Mich. L. Rev. 463, 496-501 (1983). Yet in other categories where 
physical distinctions arise from nature, courts are skeptical to 
uphold distinctions based thereon. Courts apply very strict 
scrutiny to distinctions based upon sex, race and handicaps. 
Utcih disapproves of sex based classifications as a 
matter of public policy. The Utah Constitution provides, "Both 
male and female citizens of this State shall enjoy equally all 
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civil, political and religious rights and privileges." Art. IV § 
1. Under corresponding federal laws provision a former law 
prescribing a lower age of majority for females than for males 
was discriminatory and denied equal protection under the laws. 
Stanton v. Stantonf 421 U.S. 7, 95 S.Ct. 1373, 43 L.Ed.2d 688 
(1975). And a preference for mothers over fathers in custody 
matters was held to violate that constitutional provision. Pusey 
v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986). 
And state statute provides: 
It is hereby declared that the practice of 
discrimination on the basis of . . . sex . . . in 
enterprises regulated by the state endangers the 
health, safety and general welfare of this state 
and its inhabitants; and that such discrimination 
. . . violates the public policy of this state. 
It is the purpose of [the Civil Rights Act] to 
assure all citizens full and equal availability of 
all goods, services and facilities offered by . 
. enterprises regulated by the state without 
discrimination because of . . . sex . . . . This 
act shall be liberally construed with a view to 
promote the policy and purpose of the act and to 
promote justice. . . . 
§ 13-7-1, UCA 1953. See also, §§ 34-35-1 to 34-35-8, UCA 1953 
(Antidiscrimination Act). How can a court, consistent with the 
above act, deny all fathers procreative rights given to all 
mothers? 
V. The mother's theory would frustrate a purpose of marriage. 
In Scheinberg v. Smith, 550 F.Supp. 1112 (1982) a 
federal district court ruled that a father's interest would not 
be permanently harmed, by abortion since it was unlikely his wife 
would be rendered infertile by abortion. Based on that, the 
court struck down a statute requiring notification of the husband 
On appeal the Court of Appeals reversed, Scheinberg v. 
Smith, 659 F.2d 476 (1981) , stating: 
If either partner is to enjoy one of the primary 
purposes of marriage, the bringing forth and 
nurturing of children . . . , each partner must 
cooperate in matters of childbirth. 
659 F.2d at 485. The court observed that 
[h]er husband has legally committed himself to a 
contractual relationship that prohibits the 
extra-marital creation of children. If his 
aspirations include a desire for children, it is a 
small concession for him to have the right to know 
that his wife is considering an abortion. The 
marital relationship is the only legitimate vehicle 
the husband presently has for realizing his 
procreative rights. The husband's ability to 
procreate, moreover, is entitled to constitutional 
protection. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 62 
S.Ct. 1110, tt L.Ed. T533 CT942) . The state, 
therefore, has a compelling interest in requiring a 
wife to inform her husband when she is 
contemplating termination of her pregnancy. 
659 F.2d at 485. 
The court concluded that "[hlaving children is a major purpose of 
the institution of marriage. The state's interest in maintaining 
the integrity of this component of marriage is compelling." 659 
F.2d at 486-87. 
Consideration of the words of a prominent local family 
scholar help illustrate the strong expectation a father has in 
his children: 
Men and women in most cultures have long viewed 
their offspring as somehow being an extension of 
themselves. . . . The bearing and raising of 
children has probably brought people into contact 
with some sense of the Infinite, the mysteries of 
the universe, or Nature—however one may express 
it—more than any other human experience. Thus, 
it is not surprising that common law judges refer 
to parental interests as 'sacred,1 natural,' or 
fundamental' rights. . . . 
- 20 -
Hafenr B.f Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism; Some 
Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights," 1976 
B.Y.U.L.Rev. 605, 628 (footnotes omitted). 
In fact, "the right of the parent, under natural law, to 
establish a home and bring up children is a fundamental one and 
beyond the reach of any court." People ex rel. Portnoy v. 
Strasser, 303 NY 539, 542, 104 NE2d 895, 896 (1952). Utah 
recognizes the preeminence of this "natural right". In re J.P., 
648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982); State in re Jennings, 20 Utah 2d 50, 
52; 432 P.2d 879, 880 (1967) . 
The integrity of the family unit has found 
protection in the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Ninth 
Amendment. 
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 1212, 31 
L.Ed.2d 551 (1972) . 
The parental right "transcends all property and economic 
rights." J.P., 648 P.2d at 1373. "Any invasion of the sanctity 
of the family, even with the loftiest motives, unavoidably 
threatens" the cherished values and traditions of our democratic 
society. Id. at 1376. "[lit is proper to take alarm at the 
first experiment on our liberties." Madison, J., Memorial and 
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessment, 8 The Papers of James 
Madison 298, 300 (Rutland & Rachal ed. 1973). 
The understandable frustration of a man in the father's 
position is well illustrated by the following: 
By legislating against procreation outside the 
marriage relationship, the state has the power to 
make a man totally dependent upon his wife for 
legitimate offspring. Since the woman by 
repeatedly having abortions prevents a man from 
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procreating offspring within the marriage 
relationship, an infringement of his fundamental 
right to a family has occurred. 
Poe v. Gernstein, 517 F.2d 787, 790 (1975), citing Skinner v. 
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541. 
VI. Fathers are entitled to due process, not a deaf ear. 
If a regulation of abortion is found not to impinge on a 
woman's decision to have an early abortion the state need show 
only a rational relationship to a legitimate purpose. Charles v. 
Carey, 627 F.2d 772 (C.A. 111. 1980). A regulation that does 
unduly burden the abortion decision is not always prohibited, but 
merely must be justified by compelling state interests. Wynn v. 
Carey, 599 F.2d 193 (C.A. 111. 1979). 
As noted in the immediately preceding section, 
protection of the rights of a husband and father to be involved 
in abortion decisions may present a compelling state interest. 
Scheinberg v. Smith, 659 F.2d 476, 485 (1981). 
Similarly, the liberty interest of the father is not 
absolutely protected against deprivation, only against 
deprivation without due process. Fathers' Rights, Cinn. L. Rev. 
42:460 (1973) . Like the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal 
Constitution, Utah's Constitution provides that no "life, liberty 
or property" may be denied without "due process of law." Art. I 
§ 7. The balancing suggested provides both parties their due 
process rights. See also, Art. I § 11, providing that for every 
injury the courts shall always be open and provide a remedy. 
- 2? -
Quillon v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246r 98 S.Ct. 549, 54 
L.Ed.2d 511 stressed the necessity of notice and an opportunity 
for hearing before losing rights to his child in adoption. 
Substantial protections of that sort are provided for termination 
of parental rights in § 78-3a-48, UCA 1953f and related 
provisions. Only clear and convincing evidence will suffice. In 
re M.A.V., 736 P.2d 1031 (Utah 1987). 
VII. Utah restricts abortion as a public policy. 
As indicated previously, in this case the father's and 
husband's interests combine with the interest of the state in 
preventing abortion where possible. In addition to the 
requirement the doctor notify the husband of a married woman of 
her abortive intent, § 76-7-304 UCA 1953, the following are 
examples of restrictions and policy statements on point: 
A. Abortion is prohibited on viable fetusesr unless 
necessary to preserve the life and health of the mother. § 
76-7-302 UCA 1953. And even then the procedure used must be that 
which will give the unborn child the best chance of survival. § 
76-7-307 UCA 1953. The physician must employ all his medical 
skills to save the child if it has "any reasonable possibility of 
survival outside of the mother's womb." § 76-7-308 UCA 1953. 
B. Abortion procedures may not be designed to kill or 
injure the unborn child unless necessary for the mother's life or 
health. § 76-7-307 UCA 1953. 
C. The state's declared policy is to "encourage all 
persons to respect the right to life of all others, regardless of 
agey development, condition or dependency, including all 
handicapped persons and all unborn persons." § 78-11-23 UCA 
1953. Note that unborn humans are "persons" under Utah law. Id. 
See also §§ 78-11-24 and 25 UCA 1953. 
D. Criminal Homicide includes killing an unborn child. 
"A person commits criminal homicide if he . . . causes the 
death of another human being, including an unborn child [except 
for legal abortions]." § 76-5-201(1) UCA 1953. 
E. Utah favors strengthening, not destroying, familial 
relationships. "It is the policy of the state of Utah to 
strengthen the family life foundation of our society and . . . to 
protect the rights of children." § 30-3-11.1, UCA 1953. 
VIII. Hootness should not prevent this appeal. 
The abortion in this case was within minutes after this 
Court issued its temporary restraining order, but before it was 
served upon the mother. Right after the lower court's similar 
order was dissolved, and knowing the father was seeking an 
immediate interlocutory appeal, counsel for the mother was quoted 
as saying his client would secure an abortion as soon as 
possible. Mitchell, Associated Press feed AP-NY-03-19-88 
161SEST. See also, Thompson, Utah man will appeal abortion 
decision, Deseret News, Mon., May 9, 1988, p. Bl. The close 
timing in this and other cases illustrates the need for guidance 
from this court to avoid loss of rights without due process. 
As a British legal scholar pointed out, "Babies, like the 
tide, waiteth for no man, and certainly will not wait until a 
decision is reached." Kennedy, Husband Denied a Say in Abortion 
Since the pregnancy has terminated, this case 
would ordinarily be moot. • . . We think because 
the subject that will likely arise again and 
again, the public interest will be best served if 
we address the merits of the matter, thus 
affording some guidance to litigants and trial 
courts. . . . 
Coleman v. Coleman, 471 A.2d 1115, 1117 (Md.App. 1984). 
Where the technically moot matter is of 'wide 
concern, affects the public interest, is likely to 
recur in a similar manner, and , because of the 
brief time any one person is affected, would 
otherwise likely escape judicial review. . .', 
it is justiciable. In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1371 (Utah 1982). 
IX. This is a private action to enforce private rightsr not 
•state action1, so constitutional abortion cases do not apply. 
A. The United States Constitution limits the actions of 
government. 
Because the United States Constitution was created to 
limit and regulate the exercise of governmental power by the 
states and federal government, the application of federal 
constitutional law in cases at law depends on whether the 
exercise of governmental power is at issue. 
All of the cases the mother believes give her an 
unfettered right to an abortion notwithstanding the wishes of her 
husband, the father of the child, involve actions of states 
through legislative enactments. Griswald v. Connecticut, 381 US 
479, 14 L.Ed.2d 510, 85 S.Ct.1678 (1965) (State statute 
forbidding distribution of contraceptive materials to married 
couples found unconstitutional); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 
31 L.Ed 349, 92 S.Ct. 1029 (1972) (State statute forbidding sale 
of contraceptive materials to unmarried persons found 
unconstitutional); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 , 93 S. 
Ct.705, rehearing denied 410 U.S. 959, 35 L.Ed.2d 694, 93 S.Ct.1409 
(1973) (State abortion statute found unconstitutional); Planned 
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) 
(State statute requiring husband's consent for wife to have 
abortion ruled unconstitutional); Doe v. Rampton, 366 F.Supp. 189 
(D. Utah 1975) aff'd 535 F2d 1219 (10th Cir. 1975); (State 
statute requiring husband's consent for wife to have abortion 
invalidated). 
B. This father is a private actor, not a governmental 
entity. 
The father was not trying to enforce a state statute 
when he sought to enjoin his wife's abortion. He sought to 
utilize the court system as a neutral forum to settle a private 
dispute with his wife concerning the disposition of their unborn 
child. He requested and was denied the opportunity to put on 
evidence as to whether his claim to have the child born alive 
should prevail over any right of his wife to have the child 
aborted. Instead the court ruled against him as a matter of law, 
not based on individualized facts. 
The father has not been assisted by any governmental 
entity in bringing this action. Neither has he brought this 
action at the behest of any governmental entity. His motives 
were entirely personal; namely, his natural parental concern over 
the well h^inn nf hie r«v» «i i A 
To counter the father's claim of private action, the 
mother cites the old case of Shelley v. Kraemerf 334 US 1 (1948) f 
which stated that under its facts the enlistment of the courts 
can turn a private action into government action because the 
judiciary is a branch of government. But Shelley actually 
reaffirms that the only action inhibited by constitutional rights 
is "such action as may fairly be said to be that of the States." 
334 U.S. at 13. 
C. Shelley is factually uniquer and the 'judicial 
action as state action' rule can not be universally applied. 
Under a very broad reading of Shelly v. Kraemerf all 
litigation becomes state action on the part of the plaintiff. 
334 U.S. 1 (1948). Such a result should give cause to ask whether 
that aspect of Shelley should not be examined and perhaps 
confined to the facts of the case. 
Shelley involved enforcement of covenants restricting 
the sale of property on the basis of race. The contract involved 
flew in the face of the fundamental right to be free of racial 
discrimination. It also was contrary to the public policy 
favoring free alienability of realty. On the other side was the 
enforcement of private contracts. While the law favors the 
enforcement of contracts validly made, courts of this state can 
refuse enforcement on the grounds that the contract would violate 
public policy. Frailey v. McGarry, 211 P.2d 840, 847 (Utah 
1949) . Shelley v. Kraemer thus becomes a case of a fundamental 
right opposing an interest that is valid only so long as it does 
not violate public policy. The case should be limited to its 
public policy significance. 
D. Fathers1 constitutionally protected rights in their 
children constitute powerful public policy. 
As discussed above in Section IIf fathers have 
constitutional rights to their children. On both a federal and a 
Utah level, these rights are supported by the most basic, strong 
public policy. Quillon v. Walcottr 434 U.S. 246 (1978); In re 
J.P., 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982). 
E. Use of Shelley v. Kraemer to close courts to a case 
of opposing fundamental rights itself violates Shelley. The 
question is whether Shelley v. Kraemer, which involved a 
fundamental interest on the one hand and a covenant against 
public policy on the other hand, should govern this case, which 
involves fundamental rights on both sides. The refusal of the 
trial court to hear evidence and weigh the interests of the 
father denied him due process. A refusal of the court to act 
becomes state action, violative of Shelley v. Kraemer. The 
result is a hopeless tangle unless we back away from Shelley in 
cases involving constitutional interests on both sides. 
The High Court itself has wisely backed away from Shelley 
v. Kraemer. In the "Baconsfield" controversy, a will left land 
to the city of Macon, Georgia to be used as a park for whites 
only. In Evans v. Newtonf 382 US 296 (1966), the Supreme Court 
held that the city could not constitutionally maintain the park 
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as segregated. The state courts then determined that the land 
should revert to the heirs of the testator rather than be used 
contrary to the provisions of the will. The state courts were 
clearly enforcing a discriminatory intent. The case was appealed 
to the U.S. Supreme Court, which, in Evans v. Abbney, 396 U.S. 435 
(1970)
 f declined to disturb the state court holding even though 
it was enforcing a will provision that was clearly racist. Such 
judicial enforcement was not found to involve state action. The 
case did not even involve a fundamental interest on both sides. 
F. The interests of society demand that a forum be 
available to resolve disputes between parties. 
Our system of law calls for the settlement of disputes 
in an ordered courtroom rather than by resort to self help. No 
reasonable person could deny that a father has an interest in his 
unborn child. But if Shelley v. Kraemer blocks a father's entry 
into a courthouse to weigh his interest against the interest of 
his wife, what options are then available to him? Are the 
interests of society met by locking fathers of unborn children 
out of courtroom purely on the basis of gender? The Utah 
Constitution provides for the courts to be open to every person, 
and require a remedy for every injury. Art. I, § 11. 
G. Cases of this sort involving unborn children are 
best handled within the context of divorce court. 
The Utah Code empowers the courts of this state in 
divorce actions to make equitable orders relating to children and 
the parties. § 30-3-5, UCA 1953. Because the father is private 
party asserting a personal rightf there was no cause to involve 
constitutional cases in making a decision. Absent controlling 
cases or statutef the court should have balanced the interests of 
the parties and made a determination. 
The District Court, which is Utah's family court (§ 
30-3-11.1 et. seq.) is an appropriate forum for such disputes, 
and has abundant experience in resolving highly charged domestic 
conflicts. 
VIII. Court support for Roe v. Wade is eroding. 
Since Roe v. Wade was decided in 1973 by a 7-2 margin, 
its support on the Court has declined. The case was reaffirmed 
in 1983 in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 
U.S. 416 (1983), by a 6-3 margin. The tally was 5-4 in 
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists, 106 S.Ct. 2169 (1986). Since then Justice Powell, 
one of the Thornburgh majority, has left the Court. 
Griswald v. Connecticut, the case from which the privacy 
rights in Roe originated, has also come under fire. In a 1986 
5-4 decision, the court said "[Tlhe court is most vulnerable and 
comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made 
constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the 
language or design of the Constitution." Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 
S.Ct 2841 (1986). See Reidinger, Will Roe v. Wade Be Overturned, 
A.B.A.J.f July lf 1988, at 66. Justice Oaks of our Supreme Court 
has pointed out that the Roe discovery of "rights" comes not from 
the Constitution's languagef but from elsewhere. In re J.P., 648 
P.2d 1364, 1375 (Utah 1982). Their source seems to be, 
according to Justice Douglas, "zones" and "penumbras" that 
"emanate" from various specific protections in the Bill of 
Rights. Griswald v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
Griswald1 s right to privacy was held not to extend to 
private homosexual conduct. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S.Ct. 2841 
(1986). 
Recently, Justice Blackmun, the author of the Roe v. 
Wade opinion, said to a law school audience in Little Rock, 
Arkansas recentlyr "Will Roe v. Wade go down the drain? I think 
there"s a very distinct possibility that it will— this term." 
Mauro, Blackmun sees switch on abortion, USA Today, Sept. 14, 
1988, p. Al. As a member of the Court, and as author of the 
opinion, Mr. Justice Blackmun's comment certainly provides 
insight as to the erosion of the Roe majority. 
One of Roe's weaknesses is its fatal dependence on 1973 
medical technology, on which it based its arbitrary "trimester" 
system. Fundamental constitutional questions should not rise or 
fall with mankind's transitory knowledge. That has led Justice 
0'Conner to comment that Roe's mechanism for weighing the 
competing interests of mother and state is "completely 
unworkable", and that Roe is "clearly on a collision course with 
itself." Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 
416 (1983), O'Conner, J. dissenting. The collision is the result 
of improvements in medicine that make abortions safer but also 
make it possible to save fetal lives at ever younger ages. The 
Justice noted that first-trimester viability may be possible in 
the not-distant future. Id. 
Roe used "viability" to determine when unborn children 
may be protected, suggesting 28 weeks as the dividing line. As 
indicated above, Utah physicians are required to try to preserve 
lives of premature infants, including the victims of abortion. 
See §§ 76-7-302, 76-7-307 (must employ medical skills to save the 
child with reasonable possibility of survival) , 76-7-308 and 
76-7-307 (abortion procedures may not be designed to kill or 
injure the unborn child), UCA 1953. A recent Readers1 Digest 
article chronicled the successful efforts to save an infant born 
at 22 weeks, still solidly within the second trimester. The boy 
who would, under the definition of many in the "pro-choice" 
movement, be a nonhuman fetus for weeks after his live birth, is 
now a happy five year old with only an eye disorder. A two year 
old study showed about 20 percent of infants born at the 24th 
week of pregnancy survive. 25 Clinical Pediatrics 391 (1986) . 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Society is finally recognizing that a father's role in 
his children goes much deeper than finances. To hold that case 
law disallows consideration of the father's interest when faced 
with the prospect of destruction of his unborn would be an 
unacceptable throw-back to times when children were a man's mere 
chattel. A close look at all the abortion cases reveals this is 
a first impression case without controlling precedent. 
The Court should recognize the fundamental 
constitutional rights of both parents in their childrenf and at 
least grant the father notice and an opportunity to be heard and 
have his interests weighed against those of his co-equal partner 
in procreation. 
The Roe line of cases have unfortunately not yet 
expressly recognize the interests the father has in his unborn 
child. It is high time that recognition began, and this case 
provides the vehicle. 
Appellant requests that the Court define fathers' rights 
as guidance to future courtsf litigants and parents. 
Respectfully so requested this seventh day of October, 
1988. 
Mitchell R. Barker 
Evan R. Hurst 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the seventh day of October, 1988, 
I caused to be hand delivered or mailed, postage prepaid, four 
true and correct copies of the foregoing to: 
David S. Dolowitz, Esq. 
Michael S. Evans 
Julie A. Bryan 
Cohne Rappaport & Segal 
525 East 100 South 
Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorneys for Defendant/ 
Respondent 
Mitchell R. Barker 
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ADDENDA 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
AND 
SECTIONS FOR UTAH CODE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AMEND. XII 
AMENDMENT VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have 
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature 
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and 
to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT VII 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed 
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact 
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the 
United States, than according to the rules of the common law. 
AMENDMENT VIII 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor 
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. 
AMENDMENT IX 
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people. 
AMENDMENT X 
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, 
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, 
or to the people. 
The first ten Amendments were proposed by the first Congress and were ratified 
as follows: New Jersey, Nov. 20, 1789; Maryland, Dec. 19, 1789; North Carolina, 
Dec. 2:2, 1789; South Carolina, Jan. 19, 1790; New Hampshire, Jan. 25, 1790; Delaware, 
Jan. 28, 1790; Pennsylvania, Mar. 10, 1790; New York, March 27, 1790; Rhode Island, 
June 15, 1790; Vermont, Nov. 3, 1791; Virginia, Dec. 15, 1791. Connecticut, Georgia 
and Massachusetts ratified them on April 19, 1939, March 18, 1939 and March 2, 1939, 
respectively. 
AMENDMENT XI 
The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to ex-
tend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one 
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Sub-
jects of any Foreign State. 
History: Proposed by Congress on Sep- fied by the legislatures of three-fourths 
tember 5, 1794; declared to have been rati- of all the states on January 8, 1798. 
AMENDMENT XII 
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot 
for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an 
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CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AMEND. XIV, § 5 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
Section 2. 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States accord-
ing to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons 
in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote 
at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President 
of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and 
Judicial OfiScers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is 
denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years 
of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except 
for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation 
therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male 
citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years 
of age in such State. 
Section 3. 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector 
of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under 
the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken 
an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, 
or as a member of any State legislature or as an executive or judicial 
officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, 
shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given 
aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-
thirds of each House, remove such disability. 
Section 4. 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by 
law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for 
services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. 
But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt 
or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the 
United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; 
but all such debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Section 5. 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, 
the provisions of this article. 
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ART. I, § 7 CONSTITUTION OP UTAH 
Gun control laws, val idi ty and construc-
tion of, 28 A. L. R. 3d 845. 
Law Reviews. 
The Constitutional Right to Keep and 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of 1 
process of law. 
Comparable Provision. 
Montana Const., Art . I l l , § 27. 
Cross-Reference. 
Eminent domain generally, 78-34-1 et 
seq. 
In general. 
"Due process of law" comes to us from 
the Great Charter and is synonymous with 
"law of the land." I t means tha t a par ty 
shall have his day in court—trial . Jensen 
v. Union Pac. Rv. Co., G U. 253, 21 P . 994, 
4 L. R. A. 724. 
Due process of law is not necessarily 
judicial process. People v. Hasbrouck, 11 
U. 291, 39 P . 918. 
Judgment against defendant, not served 
with process and not appearing either in 
person or by at torney, would not be due 
process of law. Blvth & Fargo Co. v. 
Swenson, 15 U. 345, "49 P . 1027. 
I t is elementary tha t there can be no 
judicial action affecting vested r ights tha t 
is not based upon some process or notice 
whereby the interested part ies are brought 
within the jurisdiction of the judicial 
t r ibunal about to render judgment. Pa r ry 
v. Bonneville I r r . Dist., 71 U. 202, 263 P . 
751. 
"Due process of law" requires tha t , be-
fore one can be bound by a judgment 
affecting his property r ights , some process 
must be served upon him which in some 
degree a t least is calculated to give him 
notice. Naisb i t t v. Herrick, 7G U. 575, 
290 P . 950. 
Due process of law requires tha t notice 
be given to the persons whose r ights are 
to be affected. I t hears before i t con-
demns, proceeds upon inquiry, and renders 
judgment only after t r ia l . Riggins v. Dis-
t r ic t Court of Salt Lake County, 89 U. 
183, 51 P . 2d 645. 
The phrase "due process of law" appar-
ently originated with Lord Coke, who de-
fined the terms. Many a t tempts have been 
made to further define due process of law, 
but all of them resolve into the thought 
that a pa r ty shall have his day in court. 
Christiansen v. Harr is , 109 U. 1, 163 P . 
2d 314. 
In depriving a person of life or lib-
erty, the essentials of due process a re : 
(a) the existence of a competent person, 
Bear Atms, Lucilius A. Emery, 28 Harv . 
L. Rev. 473. 
Restrict ions on the Right To Le;ir Anns 
—Sta te and Federal Firearms Legislation, 
98 U. Pa . L. Rev. 905. 
ife, liberty or property, without due 
body, or agency authorized by law to de-
termine the questions; (b) an inquiry 
into the meri ts of the question by such 
person, body or agency; (c) notice to the 
person of the inauguration and purpose 
of the inquiry and the time at which 
such person should appear if he wishes 
to be heard; (d) r ight to appear in per-
son or by counsel; (e) fair opportunity 
to submit evidence, examine and cross-
examine witnesses; (f) judgment to be 
rendered upon the record thus made. In 
the absence of s ta tu te laying down other 
or more specific requirements, the above 
conditions meet the demands of due 
process. In the absence of specific pro-
visions to the contrary, due process does 
not require tha t any or all of these 
requirements must be in wri t ing or in 
any par t icular form. In the interests of 
orderly procedure and certainty as to its 
proceedings and action taken, any legally 
consti tuted body or agency should as far 
as pract ical have wri t ten records of all 
proceedings before it, except where other-
wise provided bv law. Christiansen v. 
Harr is , 109 U. 1, 163 P. 2d 314. 
In the t r ia l of criminal cases the stat-
utes prescribe certain rules of procedure, 
which must be substantially complied with 
to keep the proceedings within the due 
processes of the law. A somewhat dif-
ferent set of rules is prescribed in civil 
cases and in special proceedings. Some 
rules, affecting all types, are not found in 
the s ta tu tes , but in that great basic body 
of the law commonly known as the deci-
sions or rules of the courts. But all these 
methods and means provided for the pro-
tection and enforcement of human r ights 
have the same basic requirements—that 
no pa r ty can be affected by such action, 
until his legal r ights have been the sub-
ject of an inquiry by a person or body 
authorized by law to determine such 
r ights , of which inquiry the party has due 
notice, and at which he had an opportu-
ni ty to be heard and to give evidence as 
to his r ights or defenses. Christiansen v. 
Harr is , 109 U. 1, 163 P . 2d 314. 
While normally we think of "due proc-
ess of law" as requiring judicial action, 
yet "due process" is not necessarily judi-
cial action. Christiansen v. Harris , 109 
IT. 1, 163 P . 2d 314. 
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ART. I , § 11 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Deficiency judgment, right to jury trial 
of issues as to, 112 A. L. R. 1492. 
Driving while intoxicated or similar 
offense,-right to trial by jury in criminal 
prosecution for, 16 A. L. B. 3d 1373. 
Fingerprint, palm print, or bare foot-
print evidence as violating right to jurv 
trial, 28 A. L. R. 2d 1141. 
Garnishment; issues in garnishment as 
triable to court or to jury, 19 A. L. R. 
3d 1393. 
Indoctrination by court of persons sum-
moned for jury service as violation of 
right to jury trial, 89 A. L. R. 2d 215. 
Interlocutory ruling of one judge on 
right to jury trial as binding on another 
judge in same case, 132 A. L. R. 68. 
Juvenile court delinquency proceedings, 
right to jury trial in, 100 A.*L. R. 2d 1241. 
Mandamus or prohibition as remedy to 
enforce right to jury trial, 41 A. L. R. 
2d 780. 
Provisions for determining custody or 
commitment of juvenile delinquents with-
out jury trial as denial of due process, 
100 A. L. R. 2d 1241. 
Removal of public officer, right to jury 
trial in proceedings for, 3 A. L. R. 232, 
8 A. L. R. 1476. 
Right in equity suit to jury trial of 
counterclaim involving legal issue, 17 A. 
L. R. 3d 1321. 
Right to consent to trial of criminal 
case before twelve jurors, 70 A. L. R. 
279, 105 A. L. R. 1114. 
Right to jury trial as to fact essential 
to action or defense but not involving 
merits thereof, 170 A. L. R. 383. 
Right to jury trial in action under Fair 
Labor Standards Act, 174 A. L. R. 421. 
Right to jury trial in disbarment pro-
ceedings, 107 A. L. R. 692. 
Comparable Provision. 
Montana Const., Art. IH, § 6. 
Actions by court. 
Court of equity has jurisdiction to open 
probate proceeding and to proceed against 
bond of administratrix where she haa 
practiced extrinsic fraud on the court. 
Weyant v. Utah Savings & Trust Co., 54 
U. 181, 182 P. 189, 9 A. L. R. 1119. 
Right to jury trial in proceeding to de-
termine insanity or incompetency, 33 A. 
L. R. 2d 1145. 
Right to jury trial in suit to remove 
cloud, quiet title, or determine adverse 
claims, 117 A. L. R. 9. 
Seizure of property alleged to be il-
legallv used, right to jury trial, 17 A. L. 
R. 568, 50 A. L. R. 97'. 
Substitution of judge: right to jury 
trial as violated by substitution in crimi-
nal case, 83 A. L / R . 2d 1032* 
Validity of statute allowing for sepa-
ration of'jury, 34 A. L. R. 1128, 79 A. L. 
R. 821, 21 A. L. R. 2d 1088. 
Waiver of jury trial in criminal cases 
and effect thereof on jurisdiction of court, 
48 A. L. R. 767, 58 A. L. R. 1031. 
Law Reviews. 
The Supreme Court: 1969 Term, Michael 
E. Tigar, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 165. 
New Data on the Effect of a "Death 
Qualified Jury" on the Guilt Determina-
tion Process, George L. Jurow, 84 Harv. 
L. Rev. 567. 
Jury Trial in Civil Cases, Glen W. 
Clark, 10 Mont. L. Rev. 38. 
Right to Trial by Jury in State Court 
Prosecutions, 22 S. L. J. 875. 
Right to Civil Jury Trial in Utah: Con-
stitution and Statute, Ronan E. Degnan, 
8 Utah L. Rev. 97. 
Due Process Standard of Jury Impar-
tiality Precludes Death-Qualification of 
Jurors in Capital Cases, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 
154. 
No-Fault Automobile Insurance in Utah 
—State Constitutional Issues, 1970 Utah 
L. Rev. 248. 
Actions by state. 
This section did not alter the law with 
respect to certain rights which are vested 
in the state, which alone can exercise 
sovereign powers; therefore, it does not 
prevent the state from reserving to itself 
the sole right to bring actions for the 
dissolution of building and loan associa-
tions. Union Savings & Investment Co. v. 
District Court of Salt Lake County, 44 
U. 397, 140 P. 221, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 821. 
Sec. 11. [Courts open—Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him 
in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course 
of law, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; 
and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before 
any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which 
he is a party. 
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13-7-1 COMMERCE AND TRADE 
13-7-1. Policy and purposes of act. 
It is hereby declared that the practice of discrimination on the basis of race, 
color, sex, religion, ancestry, or national origin in business establishments or 
places of public accommodation or in enterprises regulated by the state endan-
gers the health, safety, and general welfare of this state and its inhabitants; 
and that such discrimination in business establishments or places of public 
accommodation or in enterprises regulated by the state, violates the public 
policy of this state. It is the purpose of this act to assure all citizens full and 
equal availability of all goods, services and facilities offered by business estab-
lishments and places of public accommodation and enterprises regulated by 
the state without discrimination because of race, color, sex, religion, ancestry, 
or national origin. The rules of common law that statutes in derogation 
thereof shall be strictly construed has no application to this act. This act shall 
be liberally construed with a view to promote the policy and purposes of the 
act and to promote justice. The remedies provided herein shall not be exclu-
sive but shall be in addition to any other remedies available at law or equity. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 174, § 1; 1973, ch. 18, 
§ 1. 
Meaning of "this act". — The term "this 
act" refers to Laws 1965, ch. 174, which 
enacted this section and §§ 13-7-2 to 13-7-4. 
Utah Law Review. — Note: State Legisla-
tive Response to the Federal Civil Rights Act: 
A Proposal, 9 Utah L. Rev. 434. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 15 Am. Jur. 2d Civil Rights 
§ 16 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 14 C.J.S. Civil Rights §§ 6-11, 
14-21. 
A.L.R. — Actionability under state statutes 
of discrimination because of complaining 
party's association with persons of different 
race, color, or the like, 35 A.L.R.3d 859. 
Discrimination on basis of illegitimacy as de-
nial of constitutional rights, 38 A.L.R.3d 613. 
Constitutionality of enactment or regulation 
forbidding or restricting employment of aliens 
in public employment or on public works, 38 
A.L.R.3d 1213. 
Recovery of damages for emotional distress 
resulting from racial, ethnic, or religious abuse 
or discrimination, 40 A.L.R.3d 1290. 
Construction and operation of "equal oppor-
tunity clause" requiring pledge against racial 
discrimination in hiring under construction 
contract, 44 A.L.R.3d 1283. 
Racial or religious discrimination in furnish-
ing of public utilities, services, or facilities, 53 
A.L.R.3d 1027. 
Validity in application of provisions govern-
ing determination of residency for purpose of 
fixing fee differential for out-of-state students 
in public college, 56 A.L.R.3d 641. 
Cross-References. — Utah Anti-Discrimi-
nation Act, §§ 34-35-1 to 34-35-8. 
Recovery of damages for emotional distress 
resulting from discrimination because of sex or 
marital status, 61 A.L.R.3d 944. 
Trailer park as place of public accommoda-
tion within meaning of state civil rights stat-
utes, 70 A.L.R.3d 1142. 
Recovery of damages as remedy for wrongful 
discrimination under state or local civil rights 
provisions, 85 A.L.R.3d 351. 
State law prohibiting sex discrimination as 
violated by dress or grooming requirements for 
customers of establishments serving food or 
beverages, 89 A.L.R.3d 7. 
Prohibition, under state civil rights laws, of 
racial discrimination in rental of privately 
owned residential property, 96 A.L.R.3d 497. 
Identification of job seeker by race, religion, 
national origin, sex, or age, in "situation 
wanted" employment advertising as violation 
of state civil rights laws, 99 A.L.R.3d 154. 
On-the-job sexual harassment as violation of 
state civil rights law, 18 A.L.R.4th 328. 
What constitutes illegal discrimination un-
der state statutory prohibition against discrim-
ination in housing accommodations on account 
of marital status, 33 A.L.R.4th 964. 
Race as factor in adoption proceedings, 34 
A.L.R.4th 167. 
Exclusion or expulsion from association or 
club as violation of state civil rights act, 38 
A.L.R.4th 628. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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30-3-5. Disposition of property - Maintenance and health care of parties and children — 
Court to have continuing jurisdiction — Custody and visitation — Termination 
of alimony. 
30-3-6. Interlocutory decree. 
30-3-7. When decree becomes absolute. 
30-3-8. Remarriage — When unlawful. 
30-3-9. Repealed. 
30-3-10. Custody of children. 
30-3-11. Repealed. 
30-3-11.1. Family Court Act — Purpose. 
30-3-11.2. Family Court Act — Appointment of counsel for child. 
30-3-12. Family Court Act — Courts to exercise family counseling powers. 
30-3-13. Repealed. 
30-3-13.1. Family Court Act — Establishment of family court division of district court. 
30-3-14. Repealed. 
30-3-14.1. Family Court Act — Designation of judges — Terms. 
30-3-15. Repealed. 
30-3-15.1. Family Court Act — Appointment of domestic relations counselors, family court 
commissioner, and assistants and clerks. 
30-3-15.2. Family Court Act — Domestic relations counselors — Powers. 
30-3-15.3. Family Court Act — Commissioners — Powers. 
30-3-15.4. Family Court Act — Salaries and expenses. 
30-3-16. Repealed. 
30-3-16.1. Family Court Act — Jurisdiction of family court division — Powers. 
30-3-16.2. Family Court Act — Petition for conciliation. 
30-3-16.3. Family Court Act — Contents of petition. 
30-3-16.4. Family Court Act — Procedure upon filing of petition. 
30-3-16.5. Family Court Act — Fees. 
30-3-16.6. Family Court Act — Information not available to public. 
30-3-16.7. Family Court Act — Effect of petition — Pendency of action. 
30-3-17. Family Court Act — Power and jurisdiction of judge. 
30-3-17.1. Family Court Act — Proceedings deemed confidential — Written evaluation by 
counselor. 
30-3-18. Waiting period for hearing after filing for divorce — Use of counseling service 
not to be construed as condonation. 
30-3-19 to 30-3-22. Repealed. 
30-3-1. Procedure — Residence — Grounds. Proceedings in divorce 
shall be commenced and conducted in the manner provided by law for pro-
ceedings in civil causes, except as hereinafter provided, and the court may 
decree a dissolution of the marriage contract between the plaintiff and 
defendant in all cases where the plaintiff or defendant shall have been an 
actual and bona fide resident of this state and of the county where the 
action is brought or as to members of the armed forces of the United 
States who are not legal residents of this state, where the plaintiff shall 
have been stationed in this state under military orders, for three months 
next prior to the commencement of the action, for any of the following 
causes: 
(1) Impotency of the defendant at the time of marriage. 
(2) Adultery committed by the defendant subsequent to marriage. 
(3) Willful desertion of the plaintiff by the defendant for more than 
one year. 
(4) Willful neglect of the defendant to provide for the plaintiff the com-
mon necessaries of life. 
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(5) Habitual drunkeness of the defendant. 
(6) Conviction of the defendant for felony. 
(7) Cruel treatment of the plaintiff by the defendant to the extent of 
causing bodily injury or great mental distress to the plaintiff. 
(8) When the husband and wife have lived separate and apart under 
a decree of separate maintenance of any state for three consecutive years 
without cohabitation; provided that a decree of divorce granted upon this 
ground shall not affect the liability of either party under any provision 
for separate support and maintenance, if any, theretofore granted. 
(9) Permanent insanity of the defendant; provided, that no divorce shall 
be granted on the grounds of insanity unless, (a) the defendant shall have 
been duly and regularly adjudged to be insane by the legally constituted 
authorities of this or some other state prior to the commencement of the 
action, and unless, (b) it shall appear to the satisfaction of the court by 
the testimony of competent witnesses that the insanity of the defendant 
is incurable. In all such actions the court shall appoint for the defendant 
a guardian ad litem, who shall take such measures as may be necessary 
and proper to protect the interests of the defendant, and a copy of the sum-
mons and complaint must be duly served on the defendant in person, or 
by publication, as provided for by the laws of this state in other actions 
for divorce, or upon his guardian ad litem, and upon the county attorney 
for the county in which such action is prosecuted. It shall be the duty of 
such county attorney to make an investigation into the merits of the case, 
and, if the defendant resides out of this state, to have a commission issued 
to take such depositions as are necessary for that purpose, to attend the 
court upon the trial of the cause and make such defense therein as may 
be just and proper to protect the rights of the defendant and the interests 
of the state. In all such actions the court and judge thereof shall have all 
powers relative to the payment of alimony, the distribution of property and 
the custody and maintenance of minor children which such courts and 
judges may possess in other actions for divorce. Either the plaintiff or 
defendant shall, if the defendant resides in this state, upon proper notice, 
be entitled to have the defendant brought into the court upon the trial, 
or to have an examination of the defendant by two or more competent phy-
sicians, to determine the mental condition of the defendant, and for such 
purpose either party may have process from the court to enter any asylum 
or institution where such defendant may be confined. The costs of court 
in such action shall be assessed or apportioned by the court according to 
the equities of the case. 
History: R.S. 1898, § 1208; L. 1903, ch. 43, Compiler's Notes. 
§ 1; C.L. 1907, § 1208; C.L. 1917, § 2995; L. Analogous former statutes, 2 Comp. Laws 
1929, ch. 93, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 40-3-1; iggg, § 2602. 
L. 1943, ch. 46, § 1; 1955, ch. 45, § 1; 1965, ch. The 1903 amendment added subsec. (9). 
57, § 1; 1969, ch. 72, § 1. The 1929 amendment inserted requirement 
of one year's residence in the state and three 
months' residence in the county. 
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Power of court to vacate decree of divorce 
or separation upon request of both parties, 3 
ALR 3d 1216. 
Prayer to impress trust upon property or 
otherwise settle property rights, propriety of 
inclusion in bill for divorce or annulment, 93 
ALR 327. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1212; L. 
1909, ch. 109, § 4; C.L. 1917, § 3000; R.S. 1933 
& C. 1943, 40-3-5; L. 1969, ch. 72, § 3; 1975, ch. 
81, § 1; 1979, ch. 110, § 1; 1984, ch. 13, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Analogous former statutes, Comp. Laws 
1876, § 1155; 2 Comp. Laws 1888, § 2606. 
The 1969 amendment deleted a provision 
that children ten years of age and of sound 
mind have the privilege of selecting the par-
ent to which they will attach themselves; and 
substituted the fourth sentence of subsec. (1) 
for "Such subsequent changes or new orders 
Standing of strangers to divorce proceed-
ing to attack validity of divorce decree, 12 -
ALR 2d 717. 
Sufficiency of allegation of adultery in suit 
for divorce, 2 ALR 1621. 
Vacating or setting aside divorce decree 
after remarriage of party, 17 ALR 4th 1153. 
may be made by the court with respect to the 
disposal of the children or the distribution of 
property as shall be reasonable and proper." 
The 1975 amendment added the last sen-
tence of subsec. (1). 
The 1979 amendment added subsecs. (2) 
and (3). 
The 1984 amendment substituted "include 
in it" for "make" in the first sentence of 
subsec. (1); inserted the second and third sen-
tences in subsec. (1); inserted "and health 
and dental care" in the fourth sentence of 
subsec. (1); and made minor changes in 
phraseology and punctuation. 
30-3-5. Disposition of property - Maintenance and health care of 
parties and children — Court to have continuing jurisdiction — Cus-
tody and visitation — Termination of alimony. (1) When a decree of 
divorce is rendered, the court may include in it such orders in relation to 
the children, property and parties, and the maintenance and health care 
of the parties and children, as may be equitable. The court shall include 
in every decree of divorce an order assigning responsibility for the pay-
ment of reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses of the 
dependent children. If coverage is available at a reasonable cost, the court 
may also include an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of 
appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for those children. 
The court shall have continuing jurisdiction to make such subsequent 
changes or new orders with respect to the support and maintenance of the 
parties, the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, and 
health and dental care, or the distribution of the property as shall be rea-
sonable and necessary. Visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and 
other relatives shall take into consideration the welfare of the child. 
(2) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order 
of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse shall automati-
cally terminate upon the remarriage of that former spouse, unless that 
marriage is annulled and found to be void ab initio, in which case alimony 
shall resume, providing that the party paying alimony be made a party 
to the action of annulment and that party's rights are determined. 
(3) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
shall be terminated upon application of that party establishing that the 
former spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex, unless it is 
further established by the person receiving alimony that the relationship 
or association between them is without any sexual contact. 
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in, or pendency of, proceedings in habeas cor-
pus for custody of child, 110 ALR 745. 
Jurisdiction of trial or appellate court in 
respect of custody of children pending appeal 
from order or decree in divorce suit, 163 ALR 
1319. 
Jurisdiction to award custody of child dom-
iciled in state but physically outside of it, 9 
ALR 2d 434. 
Jurisdiction to award custody of child hav-
ing legal domicile in another state, 4 ALR 2d 
7. 
Maternal preference rule or presumption 
in child custody cases, modern status, 70 
ALR 3d 262. 
Mental health of contesting parent as fac-
tor in award of child custody, 74 ALR 2d 
1073. 
Mother's right to custody of child as 
affected by father's contract with third per-
son, 38 ALR 222. 
Necessity of requiring presence in court of 
both parties in proceedings relating to cus-
tody or visitation of children, 15 ALR 4th 
864. 
Nonresidence as affecting one's right to 
custody of child, 15 ALR 2d 432. 
Order in divorce or separation proceeding 
concerning removal of child from jurisdic-
tion, and award of custody to nonresident, 
154 ALR 552. 
Physical abuse of child by parent as 
ground for termination of parent's right to 
child, 53 ALR 3d 605. 
Physical disability or handicap of parent 
as factor in custody award or proceedings, 3 
ALR 4th 1044. 
Power of court to modify the provisions of 
its decree respecting custody of child as 
affected by absence of parent or child from 
its territorial jurisdiction, 70 ALR 526. 
Power of court which denied divorce, legal 
separation, or annulment, to award custody 
or make provisions for support of child, 7 
ALR 3d 1096. 
Private interview with child in determin-
ing custody, propriety of court conducting, 99 
ALR 2d 954. 
Psychiatric or mental examination for 
party seeking to obtain or retain custody of 
child, right to require, 99 ALR 3d 268. 
Race as factor in custody award or pro-
ceedings, 10 ALR 4th 796. 
Religion as factor in child custody and visi-
tation cases, 22 ALR 4th 971. 
Remarriage as ground for modification of 
divorce as to custody of child, 43 ALR 2d 363. 
Removal of child from state pending pro-
ceedings for custody as defeating jurisdiction 
to award custody, 171 ALR 1405. 
Service of notice to modify divorce decree 
or other judgment as to child's custody upon 
attorney who represented opposing party, 42 
ALR 2d 1115. 
Sexual abuse of child by parent as ground 
for termination of parent's right to child, 58 
ALR 3d 1074. 
Sexual relations of custodial parent with 
third person as justifying modification of 
child custody order, 100 ALR 3d 625. 
Social worker's expert testimony, admissi-
bility on custody issue, 1 ALR 4th 837. 
"Split," "divided," or "alternate" custody 
of children, 92 ALR 2d 695. 
Stepparent, award where contest between 
natural parent and stepparent, 10 ALR 4th 
767. 
Violation of custody or visitation provision 
of agreement or decree as affecting child sup-
port payment provision, and vice versa, 95 
ALR 2d 118. 
Welfare agency: consideration of investiga-
tion by welfare agency or the like in modify-
ing award as between parents of custody of 
children, 35 ALR 2d 629. 
Law Reviews. 
Modification of Child Custody Predicated 
on Cohabitation of the Custodial Parent: 
Jarrett v. Jarrett, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 169. 
30-3-11. Repealed. 
Repeal. 
Section 30-3-11 (L. 1957, ch. 55, §2), relat-
ing to legislative policy and purposes, was 
repealed by Laws 1961, ch. 59, § 2. 
30-3-11.1. Family Court Act — Purpose. It is the public policy of the 
state of Utah to strengthen the family life foundation of our society and 
reduce the social and economic costs to the state resulting from broken 
homes and to take reasonable measures to preserve marriages, particularly 
where minor children are involved. The purposes of this act are to protect 
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the rights of children and to promote the public welfare by preserving and 
protecting family life and the institution of matrimony by providing the 
courts with further assistance for family counseling, the reconciliation of 
spouses and the amicable settlement of domestic and family controversies. 
policy of the state of Utah to be the strength-
ening of family life by providing the courts 
with assistance for family counseling, autho-
rizing the establishment of family court divi-
sions in the district courts; providing for 
conciliation proceedings and marriage coun-
seling services therein; providing for pay-
ment of salaries and expenses of family court 
assistants from county funds; and repealing 
Section 30-3-9, Utah Code Annotated 1953. -
Laws 1969, ch. 72. 
History: C. 1953, 30-3-11.1, enacted by L. 
1969, ch. 72, § 8. 
Title of Act. 
An act amending Section 30-3-1, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended by Chapter 45, 
Laws of Utah 1955, as amended by Chapter 
57, Laws of Utah 1965; Section 30-3-4, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended by Chap-
ter 55, Laws of Utah 1957, as amended by 
Chapter 59, Laws of Utah 1961; Section 
30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953; Sections 
30-3-6 and 30-3-7, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as amended by Chapter 55, Laws of Utah 
1957; Sections 30-3-8 and 30-3-10, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953; and Sections 30-3-12 and 
30-3-17, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
enacted by Chapter 55, Laws of Utah 1957; 
enacting Sections 30-3-11.1, 30-3-11.2, 
30-3-13.1, 30-3-14.1, 30-3-15.1, 30-3-15.2, 
30-3-15.3, 30-3-15.4, 30-3-161, 30-3-16.2, 
30-3-16.3, 30-3-16.4, 30-3-16.5, 30-3-16.6, 
30-3-16.7 and 30-3-17.1, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, relating to divorce; declaring the public 
Collateral References. 
Divorce <£=> 87.5. 
27A CJS Divorce § 103.1. 
24 AmJur 2d 406, Divorce and Separation 
§339. 
Law Reviews. 
The Family Court Act, 1970 Utah L. Rev. 
106. 
New Approaches of Psychiatry: Implica-
tions for Divorce Reform, Brigitte M. 
Bodenheimer, 1970 Utah L. Rev. 191. 
30-3-11.2. Family Court Act — Appointment of counsel for child. 
If, in any action before any court of this state involving the custody or 
support of a child, it shall appear in the best interests of the child to have 
a separate exposition of the issues and personal representation for the 
child, the court may appoint counsel to represent the child throughout the 
action, and the attorney's fee for such representation may be taxed as a 
cost of the action. 
History: C. 1953, §30-3-11.2, enacted by 
L. 1969, ch. 72, § 9. 
30-3-12. Family Court Act — Courts to exercise family counseling 
powers. Each district court of the respective judicial districts, while sit-
ting in matters of divorce, annulment, separate maintenance, child custody, 
alimony and support in connection therewith, child custody in habeas cor-
pus proceedings, and adoptions, shall exercise the family counseling powers 
conferred by this act. 
History: C. 1953, 30-3-12, enacted by L. 
1957, ch. 55, § 2; L. 1969, ch. 72, § 10. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1969 amendment substituted "alimony 
and support in connection therewith, child 
custody in habeas corpus proceedings, and 
adoptions" for "in connection therewith and 
child custody in habeas corpus proceedings, 
alimony, support, and adoptions." 
Title of Act. 
An act amending Sections 30-3-4, 30-3-6 
and 30-3-7, Utah Code Annotated 1953, relat-
ing to pleadings, findings and procedure in 
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34-34-16. Right to bargain collectively not denied. 
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to deny the right of employees to 
bargain collectively with their employer by and through labor unions, labor 
organizations or any other type of associations. 
History: C. 1953, 34-34-16, enacted by L. 
1969, ch. 85, § 158. 
34-34-17. Violation of act a misdemeanor. 
A violation of this act shall constitute a misdemeanor, and each day such 
unlawful conduct, as defined in this chapter, is in effect or continued shall be 
deemed a separate offense and shall be punishable as such, as provided in this 
chapter. 
History: C. 1953, 34-34-17, .enacted by L. Cross-References. — Sentencing for mi6de-
1969, ch. 85, § 159. meanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
Meaning of "this act". — See same catch-
line in notes following § 34-28-7. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 48 Am. Jur. 2d Labor and Key Numbers. — Labor Relations «=» 1051, 
Labor Relations § 20. 1052. 
C.J.S. — 51B C.J.S. Labor Relations 
§ 1003b. 
CHAPTER 35 
ANTIDISCRIMINATION ACT 
Section 
34-35-1. Short title. 
34-35-2. Definitions. 
34-35-3. Jurisdiction of industrial commis-
sion — Creation of antidiscrim-
ination division — Co-ordinator 
of fair employment practices. 
34-35-4. Antidiscrimination division — 
Members — Meetings — Quo-
rum. 
34-35-5. Antidiscrimination division — 
Powers and duties. 
34-35-1. Short title. 
This shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah Anti-Discriminatory 
Act." 
History: C. 1953, 34-35-1, enacted by L. business establishments and places of public 
1969, ch. 85, § 160. accommodation prohibited, civil remedies, 
Cross-References. — Discrimination in §§ 13-7-1 to 13-7-4. 
Section 
34-35-6. Discriminatory or unfair employ-
ment practices — Permitted 
practices. 
34-35-7. Repealed. 
34-35-7.1. Procedure for aggrieved person to 
file claim — Investigations — 
Adjudicative proceedings — 
Settlement — Reconsideration 
— Determination. 
34-35-8. Judicial review — Procedure. 
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(8) The commission or the charging party may reasonably and fairly amend 
any charge, and the respondent may amend its answer. 
(9) (a) If, upon all the evidence at a hearing, the administrative law judge 
finds that a respondent has not engaged in a discriminatory or prohibited 
employment practice, the administrative law judge shall issue an order 
dismissing the action containing his findings of fact and conclusions of 
law. 
(b) If, the case is dismissed, the administrative law judge may recom-
mend that the respondent be reimbursed for his costs. 
(10) The commission may enact rules to govern, expedite, and effectuate 
these procedures and its own actions that do not violate the provisions of 
Chapter 46b, Title 63, or this chapter. 
(11) The procedures contained in this section and Section 34-35-8 are the 
exclusive remedy under state law for employment discrimination because of 
race, color, sex, age, religion, national origin, or handicap. 
History: C. 1953, 34-35-7.1, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 189, § 4; 1987, ch. 161, § 105. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment, effective January 1, 1988, rewrote Sub-
sections (1), (3), (4) and (5), deleted former Sub-
sections (6), (7), (11) and (12) and redesignated 
the subsequent subsections accordingly; re-
wrote present Subsection (9); substituted "that 
do not violate the provisions of Chapter 46b, 
Title 63, or this chapter" for "subject to the 
conditions and provisions of this chapter" in 
present Subsection (10); and made minor 
changes in phraseology and punctuation. 
ANALYSIS 
Procedure at hearing. 
Remedies of commission. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Procedure at heairing. 
It is not improper for the complainant's case 
to be presented by the complainant personally 
or by counsel instead of an attorney or agent 
for the commission. Beehive Medical Elecs., 
Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 583 P.2d 53 (Utah 
1978). 
Remedies of commission. 
Under proper circumstances, payment in 
lieu of job reinstatement is a permissible affir-
mative action. Beehive Medical Elecs., Inc. v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 583 P.2d 53 (Utah 1978). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Damages recoverable for wrongful 
discharge of at-will employee, 44 A.L.R.4th 
1131. 
Rights of state and municipal public em-
ployees in grievance proceedings, 46 A.L.R.4th 
913. 
Reinstatement as remedy for discriminatory 
discharge or demonition under Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act (29 USCS § 621 et 
seq.), 78 A.L.R. Fed. 575. 
34-35-8. Judicial review — Procedure. 
(1) Any complainant, or respondent claiming to be aggrieved by a final 
order of the commission, including a refusal to issue an order, may obtain 
judicial review and the commission may obtain an order of court for its en-
forcement in a proceeding as provided in this section. 
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PART 2 
CRIMINAL HOMICIDE 
Section Section 
76-5-201. Criminal homicide — Elements 76-5-203. Murder in the second degree. 
— Designations of offenses. 76-5-205. Manslaughter. 
76-5-202. Murder in the first degree. 76-5-207. Automobile homicide. 
76-5-201. Criminal homicide — Elements — Designations 
of offenses. 
(1) A person commits criminal homicide if he intentionally, knowingly, 
recklessly, with criminal negligence, or acting with a mental state otherwise 
specified in the statute defining the offense, causes the death of another 
human being, including an unborn child. There shall be no cause of action for 
criminal homicide against a mother or a physician for the death of an unborn 
child caused by an abortion where the abortion was permitted by law and the 
required consent was lawfully given. 
(2) Criminal homicide is murder in the first and second degree, manslaugh-
ter, negligent homicide, or automobile homicide. 
History: C. 1953, 76-5-201, enacted by L. "human being, including an unborn child" to 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-201; L. 1983, ch. 90, § 3; the first sentence of subsec. (1); and added the 
1983, ch. 95, § 1. second sentence of subsec. (1). 
Compiler's Notes. — This section was 
amended twice in the 1983 Session, once by Self-defense. 
chapter 90 and once by chapter 95. Neither act J*** absence of self-defense is not one of the 
referred to the other. The section is printed in- prima facie elements of homicide needed to be 
corporating the changes made by both amend- proved beyond a reasonable doubt by the state, 
ments. State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 211 (Utah 1985). 
The 1983 amendment by chapter 90 inserted Law Reviews. — For Everything There Is a 
"or acting with a mental state otherwise sped- Season: The Right to Die in the United States, 
fied in the statute defining the offense" in the 1982 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 545. 
first sentence of subsec. (1); deleted "unlaw- Note, State v. Fontana: An Illusory Solution 
fully" before "causes the death" in the first sen- to Utah's Depraved Indifference Mens Rea 
tence of subsec. (1); and made a minor change Problem, 12 J. Contemp. L. 177 (1986). 
in phraseology. A.L.R. — Corporation's criminal liability for 
The 1983 amendment by chapter 95 added homicide, 45 A.L.R.4th 1021. 
76-5-202. Murder in the first degree. 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the first degree if the actor 
intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another under any of the fol-
lowing circumstances: 
(a) The homicide was committed by a person who is confined in a jail or 
other correctional institution. 
(b) The homicide was committed incident to one act, scheme, course of 
conduct, or criminal episode during which two or more persons are killed. 
(c) The actor knowingly created a great risk of death to a person other 
than the victim and the actor. 
(d) The homicide was committed while the actor was engaged in the 
commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or 
attempting to commit, aggravated robbery, robbery, rape, rape of a child, 
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76-7-203. Sale of child. 
Law Reviews. — Artificial Insemination 
and the Law, 4 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 935 (1982). 
PART 3 
ABORTION 
Section 
76-7-301. 
76-7-305.5. 
76-7-313. 
76-7-321. 
76-7-322. 
Definitions. 
Informed consent — Information 
to be furnished to patient upon 
request — Notification that in-
formation is available — Excep-
tions — Physician's report — 
Annual report of department. 
Physician's report to department 
of health. 
Contraceptive and abortion ser-
vices — Funds — Minor — Def-
initions. 
Public funds for provision of con-
Section 
76-7-323. 
76-7-324. 
76-7-325. 
traceptive or abortion services 
restricted. 
Public funds for support entities 
providing contraceptive or abor-
tion services restricted. 
Violation of restrictions on public 
funds for contraceptive or abor-
tion services as misdemeanor. 
Notice to parent or guardian of 
minor requesting contraceptive 
— Definition of contraceptives 
— Penalty for violation. 
Law Reviews. —- Rethinking Roe v. Wade, 
1985 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 231. 
76-7-301. Definitions. 
As used in this part: 
(1) "Abortion" means the termination or attempted termination of 
human pregnancy with an intent other than to produce a live birth or to 
remove a dead unborn child, and includes all procedures undertaken to 
kill a live unborn child and includes all procedures undertaken to produce 
a miscarriage. 
(2) "Physician" means a medical doctor licensed to practice medicine 
and surgery in all branches thereof in this state, or a physician in the 
employment of the government of the United States who is similarly 
qualified. 
(3) "Hospital" means a general hospital licensed by the state depart-
ment of health according to chapter 21 of Title 26, and includes a clinic or 
other medical facility to the extent that such clinic or other medical facil-
ity provides equipment and personnel sufficient in quantity and quality 
to provide the same degree of safety to the pregnant woman and the 
unborn child as would be provided for the particular medical procedures 
undertaken by a general hospital licensed by the state department of 
health. It shall be the responsibility of the state department of health to 
determine if such clinic or other medical facility so qualifies and to so 
certify. 
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(3) "Hospital" means a general hospital licensed by the state division 
of health according to Title 26, chapter 15, and includes a clinic or other 
medical facility to the extent that such clinic or other medical facility 
provides equipment and personnel sufficient in quantity and quality to 
provide the same degree of safety to the pregnant woman and the unborn 
child as would be provided for the particular medical procedures under-
taken by a general hospital licensed by the state division of health. It 
shall be the responsibility of the state division of health to determine if 
Such clinic or other medical facility so qualifies and to so certify. 
History: 0. 1953, 76-7-301, enacted by 
L. 1974, ch. 33, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Laws 1974, ch. 33, §§1 to 17 repealed 
old sections 76-7-301 to 76-7-317 (C. 1953, 
76-7-301 to 76-7-302, enacted by ch. 196, 
§§76-7-301 to 76-7-317), relating to abor-
tion, and enacted new sections 76-7-301 to 
76-7-317. 
t i t le of Act. 
An act repealing and reenacting sections 
76-7-301, 76-7-302, 76-7-303, 76-7-304, 76-
7-305, 76-7-306, 76-7-307, 76-7-308, 76-7-309, 
76-7-310, 76-7-311, 76-7-312, 76-7-313, 76-
7-314, 76-7-315, 76-7-316, and 76-7-317, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by chap-
ter 196, Laws of Utah 1973, and repealing 
Sections 76-7-318, 76-7-319, and 76-7-320, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by 
Chapter 196, Laws of Utah 1973; relating 
to the abortion provision of the Utah 
Criminal Code; providing definition, re-
quirements, and procedures which must be 
met and followed before an abortion may 
be performed in the state of Utah.—Laws 
1974, ch. 33. 
Cross-References. 
Corroboration necessary, 77-31-14. 
CoUateral References. 
Abortion<§=U. 
1 C.J.S. Abortion § 1. 
1 Am. Jur. 2d 188, Abortion § 1. 
Admissibility, in prosecution based on 
abortion, of evidence of commission of 
similar crimes by accused, 15 A. L. E. 2d 
1080. 
Criminal responsibility of one other 
than subject
 0r actual perpetrator , of 
abortion, 4 A. £. R. 351. 
Necessity, to warrant conviction of 
abortion, that fetus be living at time of 
commission of acts, 16 A. L. E. 2d 949. 
Pregnancy as element of abortion or 
homicide based thereon, 46 A. L. E. 2d 
1393. 
Eight of action for injury to or death of 
woman who consented to abortion, 21 
A. L. E. 2d 369. 
Woman upon whom abortion is commit-
ted or attempted as accomplice for pur-
poses of rule requiring corroboration of 
accomplice testimony, 34 A. L. E. 3d 858. 
Law Reviews. 
Utah Legislative Survey—1974, 1974 
Utah L. Eev. 646. 
DECISIONS UNDEE FOEMEE LAW 
1973 abortion provisions unconstitutional. 
Sections 76-7-302(3), 76-7-303 to 76-7-311, 
and 76-7-313 to 76-7-319, enacted by Laws 
1973, ch. 196, were held unconstitutional 
by a three-judge federal district court. 
Doe v. Eampton, 366 F. Supp. 189. 
76-7-302. Circumstances under which abortion authorized.—An abor-
tion may be performed in this state only under the following circumstances : 
(1) If performed by a physician; and 
(2) If performed ninety days or more after the commencement of the 
pregnancy, it is performed in a hospital; and 
(3) If performed when the unborn child is sufficiently developed to 
have any reasonable possibility of survival outside its mother's womb, 
the abortion is necessary to save the life of the pregnant woman or to 
prevent serious and permanent damage to her health. 
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History: C. 1053, 76-7-302, enacted by CoUateral References. 
L. 1974, ch. S3, § 2. Abortion<£=>2. 
1 C.J.S. Abortion § 2. 
1 Am. Jur. 2d 195, Abortion § 14. 
76-7-303. Concurrence of attending physician based on medical judg-
ment.—No abortion may be performed in this state without the concurrence 
of the attending physician, based on his best medical judgment. 
History: C. 1953, 76-7-303, enacted by 
L. 1974, ch. 33, § 3. 
76-7-304. Considerations by physician—Notice to minor's parents or 
guardian or married woman's husband.—To enable the physician to exer-
cise his best medical judgment, he shall: 
(1) Consider all factors relevant to the well-being of the woman 
upon whom the abortion is to be performed including, but not limited to, 
(a) Her physical, emotional and psychological health and safety, 
(b) Her age, 
(c) Her familial situation. 
(2) Notify, if possible, the parents or guardian of the woman upon 
whom the abortion is to be performed, if she is a minor or the husband of 
the woman, if she is married. 
History: O. 1953, 76-7-304, enacted by 
L. 1974, ch. 33, § 4. 
76-7-305. Consent requirements for abortion.—(1) No abortion may 
be performed unless a voluntary and informed written consent is first 
obtained by the attending physician from the woman upon whom the 
abortion is to be performed. 
(2) No consent obtained pursuant to the provisions of this section 
shall be considered voluntary and informed unless the attending physician 
has informed the woman upon whom the abortion is to be performed: 
(a) Of the names and addresses of two licensed adoption agencies 
in the state of Utah and the services that can be performed by those agen-
cies, and nonagency adoption may be legally arranged; and 
(b) Of the details of development of unborn children and abortion 
procedures, including any foreseeable complications, risks, and the nature 
of the post-operative recuperation period; and 
(c) Of any other factors he deems relevant to a voluntary and in-
formed consent. 
History: C. 1953, 76-7-305, enacted by Bight of minor to have abortion per-
il. 1974, cb. 33, § 5. formed without parental consent, 42 
A. L. R. 3d 1406. 
CoUateral Eeferences. Woman's right to have abortion without 
Mental competency of patient to con- consent of, or against objections of, child's 
sent to surgical operation or medical treat- father, 62 A. L. R. 3d 1097. 
ment, 25 A. L. R. 3d 1439. 
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76-7-306. Physician, hospital employee, or hospital not required to par-
ticipate in abortion.—(1) A physician, or any other person who is a 
member of or associated with the staff of a hospital, or any employee 
of a hospital in which an abortion has been authorized, who states an 
objection to an abortion or the practice of abortion in general on moral 
or religious grounds shall not be required to participate in the medical 
procedures which will result in the abortion, and the refusal of any person 
to participate shall not form the basis of any claim for damages on ac-
count of the refusal or for any disciplinary or recriminatory action against 
such person, nor shall any moral or religious scruples or objections to 
abortions be the grounds for any discrimination in hiring in this state. 
(2) Nothing in this act [part] shall require any private and/or 
denominational hospital to admit any patient for the purpose of performing 
an abortion. 
History: 0. 1953, 76-7-306, enacted by 
L. 1974, ch. 33, §6. 
76-7-307. Medical procedure required to save life of unborn child.— 
If an abortion is performed when the unborn child is sufficiently developed 
to have any reasonable possibility of survival outside its mother's womb, 
the medical procedure used must be that which, in the best medical 
judgment of the physician will give the unborn child the best chance of 
survival. No medical procedure designed to kill or injure an unborn child 
may be used unless necessary, in the opinion of the woman's physician, 
to save her life or prevent serious and permanent damage to her health. 
History: 0. 1953, 76-7-307, enacted by 
L. 1974, cb.S3>§7. 
76-7-308. Medical skills required to preserve life of unborn child.— 
Consistent with the purpose of saving the life of the woman or preventing 
serious and permanent damage to the woman's health, the physician 
performing the abortion must use all of his medical skills to attempt to 
promote, preserve and maintain the life of any unborn child sufficiently 
developed to have any reasonable possibility of survival outside of the 
mother's womb. 
History: 0. 1953, 76-7-308, enacted by 
L. 1974, ch. S3, § 8. 
76-7-309. Pathologist's report.—Any human tissue removed during an 
abortion shall be submitted to a pathologist who shall make a report, 
including, but not limited to whether there was a pregnancy, and if possible, 
whether the pregnancy was aborted by evacuating the uterus. 
History: O. 1953, 76-7-309, enacted by 
X. 1974, cb. S3, § 9. 
76-7-310. Experimentation with unborn children prohibited—Testing 
for genetic defects.—Live unborn children may not be used for experimen-
tation, but when advisable, in the best medical judgment of the physi-
cian, may be tested for genetic defects. 
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ex rel. Kelsey, 20 Utah 2d 131, 434 P.2d 445 vided. State ex rel. F _ v. Dade, 14 Utah 2d 47, 
(1967). 376 P.2d 948 (1962). 
Conditions for restoration of parental cus- Notice. 
tody. After original notice of petition had been 
Where there had been previous findings of given, no further notice need be given of appli-
parent's unfitness to have custody of his minor cation by probation officer or otherwise for a 
daughter, it was not an abuse of discretion for modification, suspension, or change of any or-
court to require such parent to conduct himself der or judgment affecting the custody, control 
"becomingly" for a period of ten months before or conduct of a juvenile delinquent because 
such custody would be given. State v. child was constructively in custody of such 
Sorensen, 102 Utah 474, 132 P.2d 132 (1942). court and failure to give further notice was not 
jurisdictional. It was better practice, however, 
Grandparent 's petition for custody. to give notice of application both to delinquent 
•HUB section does not prohibit a grandparent
 a n d t 0 t h o s e w h o m i h t b e i n t e r e s t e d i n h i s 
from filing a petition for custody of his grand-
 w e l f a r e S t o k e r v G o w a n s 4 5 U t a h 5 5 6 1 4 7 p 
child after the rights of the grandchild s par-
 g n 1 9 1 6 E A n n C a g 1 Q 2 5 ( 1 9 1 3 ) 
ents have been terminated. State ex rel. Sum-
mers v. Wulffenstein, 571 P.2d 1319 (Utah Right to hearing. 
1977). Where juvenile court had previously entered 
_, . .... . a proper order depriving parents of custodv of 
Mental condition of parent. their minor children and parents petitioned for 
Where children had been placed in custody of
 r e s t o r a t i o n o f e u s t o d v o n ^ ^ ^ o f c h a n g e d 
state department of public welfare for purpose
 c o n d l t i o n S - r e f u s a l 0f j u v e n i l e c o u r t t 0 g,.ant 
of adoption because of parents mental condi-
 t s a h e a r j w a g a n a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n 
tion, mother was not entitled to restoration of
 I n r e S t a t e e x r e , L j j n U t a h 2 d 3 9 3 36Q 
custody where she was unable to demonstrate p 9^ 435 (196I) 
any real understanding of what was necessary 
for the welfare of the children or how much Cited in State ex rel. A.H. v. Mr. & Mrs. H. 
money it would take or how it could be pro- (Utah 1986) 716 P.2d 284. 
78-3a-48, Termination of parental rights — Grounds — 
Hearing — Effect of order — Placement of child 
— Voluntary petition of parent, 
(1) The court may decree a termination of all parental rights with respect to 
one or both parents if the court finds either (a), (b), (c), or (d) as follows: 
(a) that the parent or parents are unfit or incompetent by reason of 
conduct or condition which is seriously detrimental to the child; 
(b) that the parent or parents have abandoned the child. It is prima 
facie evidence of abandonment that the parent or parents, although hav-
ing legal custody of the child, have surrendered physical custody of the 
child, and for a period of six months following the surrender have not 
manifested to the child or to the person having the physical custody of the 
child a firm intention to resume physical custody or to make arrange-
ments for the care of the child; 
(c) that after a period of trial, during which the child was left in his 
own home under protective supervision or probation, or during which the 
child was returned to live in his own home, the parent or parents substan-
tially and continuously or repeatedly refused or failed to give the child 
proper parental care and protection; or 
(d) has failed to communicate via mail, telephone, or otherwise for one 
year with the child or shown the normal interest of a natural parent, 
without just cause. 
(2) A termination of parental rights may be ordered only after a hearing is 
held specifically on the question of terminating the rights of the parent or 
parents. A verbatim record of the proceedings must be taken and the parties 
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must be advised of their right to counsel. No hearing may be held earlier than 
ten days after service of summons is completed inside or outside of the state. 
The summons must contain a statement to the effect that the rights of the 
parent or parents are proposed to be permanently terminated in the proceed-
ings. The statement may be made in the summons originally issued in the 
proceeding or in a separate summons subsequently issued. 
(3) Unless there is an appeal from the order terminating the rights of one or 
both parents, the order permanently terminates the legal parent-child rela-
tionship and all the rights and duties, including residual parental rights and 
duties, of the parent or parents involved. 
(4) Upon the entry of an order terminating the rights of the parent or 
parents, the court may (a) place the child in the legal custody and guardian-
ship of a child placement agency or the department of public welfare for 
purposes of adoption, or (b) make any other disposition of the child authorized 
under § 78-3a-39. All adoptable children shall be placed for adoption. 
(5) The parent-child relationship may be terminated upon voluntary peti-
tion of one or both parents if the court finds that the termination is in the best 
interests of the parent and the child. This termination with respect to one 
parent does not affect the rights of the other parent. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 47, formerly C. of parental rights upon a finding of best inter-
1953, 55-10-109 redes, as 78-3a-48; L. 1980, ests of the child without requiring a finding of 
ch. 40, § 1; 1981, ch. 157, § 1; 1985, ch. 199, parental unfitness, abandonment, or substan-
§ 1- tial neglect was unconstitutional on its face 
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amend-
 s i n c e i t violated a parent's rights to his child 
ment substituted "a termination" for "an invol-
 u n d e r U t a h Const., Art. I, Sees. 7 and 25 and 
untary termination" in Subsection (1); rewrote
 t h e n i n t h a n d f o u r t eenth amendments of the 
Subsection (l)(a), which formerly read as
 f e d e r a l C o n s t i t u t i o n ; t h a t t h e 1 9 8 i amendment 
amended by Laws 1981, chapter 157, § 1; de-
 tQ ^ ^ w h k h o n l y a d d e d n e w ^ ^ 
leted Subsections (lXani) through
 c J * .I. u-u" u ± • «. ^ J /iw \i •••wn\ u- i_ c i J J J for determining the childs best interest under (lKaXviuKC), which formerly read as amended
 A, . , ,
 B
. , , . , , , .
 n n o n , 
by Laws 1981, chapter 157, § 1; added Subsec- t h e s t * n d a r d e s t a b l l s h e d °>' t h * 1 9 ^ aniend-
tion (Did); substituted "may" for "shall" in the m e n t ' dofLnot r e m a i n i n fect after the invah-
third sentence of Subsection (2); and made d a t l o n o f t h e 1 9 8 0 amendment; and that this 
minor changes in phraseology. section, as enacted in 1965, is not repealed, but 
Compiler's Notes. — The Supreme Court of remains in force to the same extent as if the 
Utah, in In re J. P. (1982) 648 P.2d 1364, held: portions of the 1980 and 1981 amendments in-
that the 1980 amendment to this section, validated by the opinion had never been en-
which permitted the involuntary termination acted. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Abandonment. 
Abandonment by parent not in legal custody of child. 
Adoption considerations. 
Conditions precedent to termination. 
Diligent search for missing parents. 
Divorce decrees. 
Evidence. 
—Sufficient to terminate rights. 
—Standard. 
—Standard of proof. 
Grandparent's rights. 
—Recommendation of welfare representative. 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Stalking the Good Notice of Good Samaritan and Duty to Rescue 
Samaritan: Communists, Capitalists and the Laws, 11 J. Contemp. L. 219 (1984). 
Duty to Rescue, 1977 Utah L. Rev. 529. A.L.R. — Construction of "Good Samaritan" 
Utah Legislative Survey — 1983, 1984 Utah statute excusing from civil liability one render-
L. Rev. 115, 217. ing care in emergency, 39 A.L.R.3d 222. 
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Taking Key Numbers. — Negligence *» 8. 
78-11-23. Right to life — State policy. 
The Legislature finds and declares that it is the public policy of this state to 
encourage all persons to respect the right to life of all other persons, regard-
less of age, development, condition or dependency, including all handicapped 
persons and all unborn persons. 
History: L. 1983, ch. 167, § 1. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Utah Legislative Alquijay v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hospital: The 
Survey — 1983, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 115, 221. Inequitable Umbrella of Wrongful Life, 12 J. 
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Note, Contemp. L. 137 (1986). 
78-11-24. Act or omission preventing abortion not action-
able. 
A cause of action shall not arise, and damages shall not be awarded, on 
behalf of any person, based on the claim that but for the act or omission of 
another, a person would not have been permitted to have been born alive but 
would have been aborted. 
History: L. 1983, ch. 167, § 2. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Wrongful Birth and Journal of Contemporary Law. — Note, 
Wrongful Life: Analysis of the Causes of Ac- Alquijay v. St Luke's-Roosevelt Hospital: The 
tion and the Impact of Utah's Statutory Break- Inequitable Umbrella of Wrongful Life, 12 J. 
water, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 833. Contemp. L. 137 (1986). 
78-11-25. Failure or refusal to prevent birth not a defense. 
The failure or refusal of any person to prevent the live birth of a person 
shall not be a defense in any action, and shall not be considered in awarding 
damages or child support, or imposing a penalty, in any action. 
History; L. 1983, ch. 167, § 3. 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Reviews. —- Comment, The Utah Am. Jur. 2d. — 2 Am. Jur. 2d Adoption 
Supreme Court and the Utah State Constitu- § 10. 
tion, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 319. C.J.S. — 2 C.J.S. Adoption of Persons § 13. 
Key Numbers. — Adoption «= 4. 
78-30-3. Adoption by married persons. 
A married man, not lawfully separated from his wife, cannot adopt a child 
without the consent of his wife, nor can a married woman, not thus separated 
from her husband, adopt a child without his consent, if the spouse not consent-
ing is capable of giving such consent. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 3; C.L. 
1917, § 12; L. 1919, ch. 1, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C. 
1943, 14-4-3. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 2 Am. Jur. 2d Adoption C.J.S. — 2 C.J.S. Adoption of Persons § 14. 
§ 4 1 . Key Numbers. — Adoption «=> 7. 
78-30-4. Consent to adoption — Paternity claims. 
(1) A child cannot be adopted without the consent of each living parent 
having rights in relation to said child, except that consent is not necessary 
from a father or mother who has been judicially deprived of the custody of the 
child on account of cruelty, neglect or desertion; provided, that the district 
court may order the adoption of any child, without notice to or consent in court 
of the parent or parents thereof, whenever it shall appear that the parent or 
parents whose consent would otherwise be required have theretofore, in writ-
ing, acknowledged before any officer authorized to take acknowledgments, 
released his or her or their control or custody of such child to any agency 
licensed to receive children for placement or adoption under Chapter 8a, Title 
55, and such agency consents, in writing, to such adoption or whenever it 
shall appear that the parent or parents whose consent would otherwise be 
required have theretofore, in writing, released his or her or their control, 
custody, and all parental rights and interests in such child to any agency 
licensed or authorized by statute to receive children for placement or adoption 
in any state pursuant to that state's laws and said agency has in turn, in 
writing, released its control and custody of such child to any agency licensed 
under Chapter 8a, Title 55, or to any person, or persons, selected by that 
agency licensed under Utah law, as adoptive parents for said child, and such 
Utah agency consents, in writing, to such adoption. 
(2) A minor parent shall have the power to consent to the adoption of such 
parent's child, and a minor parent shall have the power to release such par-
ent's control or custody of such parent's child to any agency licensed to receive 
children for placement or adoption under Chapter 8 [Chapter 8a], Title 55, 
and, such a consent or release so executed shall be valid and have the same 
force and effect as a consent or release executed by an adult parent. A minor 
parent, having so executed a release or consent, cannot revoke the same upon 
such parent's attaining the age of majority. 
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(3) (a) A person who is the father or claims to be the father of an illegiti-
mate child may claim rights pertaining to his paternity of the child by 
registering with the registrar of vital statistics in the department of 
health, a notice of his claim of paternity of an illegitimate child and of his 
willingness and intent to support the child to the best of his ability. The 
department of health shall provide forms for the purpose of registering 
the notices, and the forms shall be made available through the depart-
ment and in the office of the county clerk in every county in this state. 
(b) The notice may be registered prior to the birth of the child but must 
be registered prior to the date the illegitimate child is relinquished or 
placed with an agency licensed to provide adoption services or prior to the 
filing of a petition by a person with whom the mother has placed the child 
for adoption. The notice shall be signed by the registrant and shall in-
clude his name and address, the name and last known address of the 
mother, and either the birthdate of the child or the probable month and 
year of the expected birth of the child. The department of health shall 
maintain a confidential registry for this purpose. 
(c) Any father of such child who fails to file and register his notice of 
claim to paternity and his agreement to support the child shall be barred 
from thereafter bringing or maintaining any action to establish his pater-
nity of the child. Such failure shall further constitute an abandonment of 
said child and a waiver and surrender of any right to notice of or to a 
hearing in any judicial proceeding for the adoption of said child, and the 
consent of such father to the adoption of such child shall not be required. 
(d) In any adoption proceeding pertaining to an illegitimate child, if 
there is no showing that the father has consented to the proposed adop-
tion, it shall be necessary to file with the court prior to the granting of a 
decree allowing the adoption a certificate from the department of health, 
signed by the state registrar of vital statistics wrhich certificate shall state 
that a diligent search has been made of the registry of notices from fa-
thers of illegitimate children and that no registration has been found 
pertaining to the father of the illegitimate child in question. 
History: L. 1981, ch. 126, § 61. referred to in this section, was repealed by 
Repeals and Enactments. — Laws 1981, Laws 1971, ch. 133, § 7. For present provisions 
ch. 126, § 61 repealed former § 78-30-4 (R.S. concerning child placing agencies, see 
1898 & C.L. 1907, § 4; C.L. 1917, § 13; L. *
 5 5 8 a l e t s e a 
1925, ch. 91, § 1: R.S, 1933,14-4-4; L. 1941, ch.
 r „ r t c c W o f t t j L ^ 0 f l AfTO „f mo^i^ 
16, § 1; C. 1943, 14-4-4; L. 1963. ch. 192, § 1; . Cross-References. - Age of majority, 
1965, ch. 168, § 1; 1966 (1st S.S.), ch. 20, § 1; * 15"z"1" 
1975, ch. 94, § 1), relating to consent to adop-
tion, and enacted present § 78-30-4. 
Compiler's Notes. — Chapter 8, Title 55, 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Abandonment. 
Acknowledgment of signature to consent. 
Appearance before district court. 
Consent. 
Construction of statute. 
Duress. 
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78-30-4 JUDICIAL CODE 
78-30-4. Consent to adoption — Paternity claims. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
—Federal abstention. 
—State action. 
Father's filing of notice of paternity. 
Constitutionality. a private adoption to the extent that they may 
r , , , , ,. be considered state actors for the purpose of 
~nZ IA a , !f I??' ^
 u * • J A. testing whether the father's parental rights The federal district court abstained from ° *-.». *• n * • f J a 
» i n .i *•* *• l were constitutionally terminated. Swayne v. hearing a case challenging the constitutional- > £ 
lty of this section in favor of requiring resolu- xit h 1987^ ^ 1 Y O ' u , v / ^«FF- xuu,
 v^. 
tion by the state courts of the questions pre- l9o/). 
sented. Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Servs., 670 F. Father's filing of notice of paternity. 
Supp. 1537 (D. Utah 1987).
 T o a p p i y t h i s section in order to deprive a 
State action. putative father and his child of the possible 
Termination of father's parental rights by benefits of their relationship simply because 
operation of this section, which provides that the father filed a notice of his claim of pater-
the father of an illegitimate child conclusively nity filed just a few hours after the mother and 
is presumed to have abandoned his child if he her grandfather had filed a petition for adop-
fails to file a claim of paternity and notice of tion would fly in the face of fundamental fair-
willingness to support the child in accordance ness and due process. In re K.B.E., 63 Utah 
with Subsection (3)(b), implicates the actors in Adv. Rep. 27 (Ct. App. 1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments The Putative Father's Due Process Rights to 
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Family Notice and a Hearing: In re Baby Boy Doe, 
Law, 1987 Utah L. Rev. 200. 1986 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1081. 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Note, 
78-30-5. Consent unnecessary — Parents fail to support or 
communicate with child — Noncustodial parent 
— Conditions. 
( D A child may be adopted without the consent of the parent or parents, 
when the district court in which the proceedings are pending determines, 
after notice to the parent or parents in a manner determined by the court, that 
the parent or parents, having the ability and duty to do so, have not provided 
support and have made no effort or only token effort, without good cause, to 
maintain a parental relationship with the child. 
(2) A child may be adopted without the consent of the parent not having 
custody of the child, when the district court in which the proceedings are 
pending determines: 
(a) the noncustodial parent is not obligated under any order or judg-
ment of any court or administrative body to pay for support of the child; 
and 
(b) the noncustodial parent has made no effort or only token effort,, 
without good cause, to maintain a parental relationship with the child. 
(3) It is a rebuttable presumption that no effort to maintain a parental 
relationship has been made: 
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(a) under Subsection (1), if the parent or parents have failed to support 
and communicate with the child for a period of one year or longer; or 
(b) under Subsection (2), if the noncustodial parent has failed to com-
municate with the child for a period of one year or longer. 
History: C. 1953, 78-30-5, enacted by L. rebuttable presumption that no effort has been 
1977, ch. 147, § 1; 1988, ch. 165, § 1. made if the parent or parents have failed to 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- support and communicate with the child for a 
ment, effective April 25, 1988, added Subsec- period of one year or longer"; and added Sub-
tion designation (1); deleted the former second sections (2) and (3). 
sentence of Subsection (1) which read "It is a 
78-30-7. Jurisdiction of district and juvenile court. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
78-30-8. Procedure — Agreement of adopting parents. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Appearance before district court and is jurisdictionally required, and that, with-
The appearance requirement of the person out compliance, the adoption could be nullified, 
adopting the child, the child adopted, and the In re M.L.T., 746 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1987). 
consenting parent must be strictly construed 
78-30-11. Rights and liabilities of natural parents. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
78-30-12. Adoption by acknowledgment. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in K.O. v. Denison, 74 Utah Adv. Rep. 
29 (Ct. App. 1988). 
Utah Law Review. — Note, Religious 
Matching and Parental Preference: Easton v. 
Angus, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 559. 
Father. 
—Adjudication of rights. 
Concomitant with the rights of a legitimated 
child adopted by the acknowledgment of its fa-
ther are the rights of its biological father. In a 
dispute with the child's mother over visitation 
rights or custody, the biological fathers rights 
with respect to the legitimated child are adju-
dicated under the divorce laws codified in 
§§ 30-3-5 and 30-3-10. Chandler v. Mathews 
734 P.2d 907 (Utah 1987). 
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